security-audit

Name: security-audit
Author: aptos-labs

19stars8forks

How to install security-audit?

aptos-labs/aptos-agent-skills/security-audit

$npx -y skills add aptos-labs/aptos-agent-skills --skill security-audit

Installs into the current project.

Summary

Audits Move contracts for security vulnerabilities before deployment using 7-category checklist. Triggers on: 'audit contract', 'security check', 'review security', 'check for vulnerabilities', 'security audit', 'is this secure', 'find security issues'.

Files · 1

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SKILL.md

1	# Security Audit Skill
2
3	## Overview
4
5	This skill performs systematic security audits of Move contracts using a comprehensive checklist. Every item must pass
6	before deployment.
7
8	Critical: Security is non-negotiable. User funds depend on correct implementation.
9
10	## Core Workflow
11
12	### Step 1: Run Security Checklist
13
14	Review ALL categories in order:
15
16	1. Access Control - Who can call functions?
17	2. Input Validation - Are inputs checked?
18	3. Object Safety - Object model used correctly?
19	4. Reference Safety - No dangerous references exposed?
20	5. Arithmetic Safety - Overflow/underflow prevented?
21	6. Generic Type Safety - Phantom types used correctly?
22	7. Testing - 100% coverage achieved?
23
24	### Step 2: Access Control Audit
25
26	Verify:
27
28	- [ ] All `entry` functions verify signer authority
29	- [ ] Object ownership checked with `object::owner()`
30	- [ ] Admin functions check caller is admin
31	- [ ] Function visibility uses least-privilege
32	- [ ] No public functions modify state without checks
33
34	Check for:
35
36	```move
37	// ✅ CORRECT: Signer verification
38	public entry fun update_config(admin: &signer, value: u64) acquires Config {
39	let config = borrow_global<Config>(@my_addr);
40	assert!(signer::address_of(admin) == config.admin, E_NOT_ADMIN);
41	// Safe to proceed
42	}
43
44	// ❌ WRONG: No verification
45	public entry fun update_config(admin: &signer, value: u64) acquires Config {
46	let config = borrow_global_mut<Config>(@my_addr);
47	config.value = value; // Anyone can call!
48	}
49	```
50
51	For objects:
52
53	```move
54	// ✅ CORRECT: Ownership verification
55	public entry fun transfer_item(
56	owner: &signer,
57	item: Object<Item>,
58	to: address
59	) acquires Item {
60	assert!(object::owner(item) == signer::address_of(owner), E_NOT_OWNER);
61	// Safe to transfer
62	}
63
64	// ❌ WRONG: No ownership check
65	public entry fun transfer_item(
66	owner: &signer,
67	item: Object<Item>,
68	to: address
69	) acquires Item {
70	// Anyone can transfer any item!
71	}
72	```
73
74	### Step 3: Input Validation Audit
75
76	Verify:
77
78	- [ ] Numeric inputs checked for zero: `assert!(amount > 0, E_ZERO_AMOUNT)`
79	- [ ] Numeric inputs within max limits: `assert!(amount <= MAX, E_AMOUNT_TOO_HIGH)`
80	- [ ] Vector lengths validated: `assert!(vector::length(&v) > 0, E_EMPTY_VECTOR)`
81	- [ ] String lengths checked: `assert!(string::length(&s) <= MAX_LENGTH, E_NAME_TOO_LONG)`
82	- [ ] Addresses validated: `assert!(addr != @0x0, E_ZERO_ADDRESS)`
83	- [ ] Enum-like values in range: `assert!(type_id < MAX_TYPES, E_INVALID_TYPE)`
84
85	Check for:
86
87	```move
88	// ✅ CORRECT: Comprehensive validation
89	public entry fun deposit(user: &signer, amount: u64) acquires Account {
90	assert!(amount > 0, E_ZERO_AMOUNT);
91	assert!(amount <= MAX_DEPOSIT_AMOUNT, E_AMOUNT_TOO_HIGH);
92
93	let account = borrow_global_mut<Account>(signer::address_of(user));
94	assert!(account.balance <= MAX_U64 - amount, E_OVERFLOW);
95
96	account.balance = account.balance + amount;
97	}
98
99	// ❌ WRONG: No validation
100	public entry fun deposit(user: &signer, amount: u64) acquires Account {
101	let account = borrow_global_mut<Account>(signer::address_of(user));
102	account.balance = account.balance + amount; // Can overflow!
103	}
104	```
105
106	### Step 4: Object Safety Audit
107
108	Verify:
109
110	- [ ] ConstructorRef never returned from public functions
111	- [ ] All refs (TransferRef, DeleteRef, ExtendRef) generated in constructor
112	- [ ] Object signer only used during construction or with ExtendRef
113	- [ ] Ungated transfers disabled unless explicitly needed
114	- [ ] DeleteRef only generated for truly burnable objects
115
116	Check for:
117
118	```move
119	// ❌ DANGEROUS: Returning ConstructorRef
120	public fun create_item(): ConstructorRef {
121	let constructor_ref = object::create_object(@my_addr);
122	constructor_ref // Caller can destroy object!
123	}
124
125	// ✅ CORRECT: Return Object<T>
126	public fun create_item(creator: &signer): Object<Item> {
127	let constructor_ref = object::create_object(signer::address_of(creator));
128
129	let transfer_ref = object::generate_transfer_ref(&constructor_ref);
130	let delete_ref = object::generate_delete_ref(&constructor_ref);
131	let object_signer = object::generate_signer(&constructor_ref);
132
133	move_to(&object_signer, Item { transfer_ref, delete_ref });
134
135	object::object_from_constructor_ref<Item>(&constructor_ref)
136	}
137	```
138
139	### Step 5: Reference Safety Audit
140
141	Verify:
142
143	- [ ] No `&mut` references exposed in public function signatures
144	- [ ] Critical fields protected from `mem::swap`
145	- [ ] Mutable borrows minimized in scope
146
147	Check for:
148
149	```move
150	// ❌ DANGEROUS: Exposing mutable reference

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security-audit

19stars8forks

View on GitHub

How to install security-audit?

aptos-labs/aptos-agent-skills/security-audit

$npx -y skills add aptos-labs/aptos-agent-skills --skill security-audit

Installs into the current project.

Summary

Files · 1

View on GitHub

SKILL.md

1	# Security Audit Skill
2
3	## Overview
4
5	This skill performs systematic security audits of Move contracts using a comprehensive checklist. Every item must pass
6	before deployment.
7
8	Critical: Security is non-negotiable. User funds depend on correct implementation.
9
10	## Core Workflow
11
12	### Step 1: Run Security Checklist
13
14	Review ALL categories in order:
15
16	1. Access Control - Who can call functions?
17	2. Input Validation - Are inputs checked?
18	3. Object Safety - Object model used correctly?
19	4. Reference Safety - No dangerous references exposed?
20	5. Arithmetic Safety - Overflow/underflow prevented?
21	6. Generic Type Safety - Phantom types used correctly?
22	7. Testing - 100% coverage achieved?
23
24	### Step 2: Access Control Audit
25
26	Verify:
27
28	- [ ] All `entry` functions verify signer authority
29	- [ ] Object ownership checked with `object::owner()`
30	- [ ] Admin functions check caller is admin
31	- [ ] Function visibility uses least-privilege
32	- [ ] No public functions modify state without checks
33
34	Check for:
35
36	```move
37	// ✅ CORRECT: Signer verification
38	public entry fun update_config(admin: &signer, value: u64) acquires Config {
39	let config = borrow_global<Config>(@my_addr);
40	assert!(signer::address_of(admin) == config.admin, E_NOT_ADMIN);
41	// Safe to proceed
42	}
43
44	// ❌ WRONG: No verification
45	public entry fun update_config(admin: &signer, value: u64) acquires Config {
46	let config = borrow_global_mut<Config>(@my_addr);
47	config.value = value; // Anyone can call!
48	}
49	```
50
51	For objects:
52
53	```move
54	// ✅ CORRECT: Ownership verification
55	public entry fun transfer_item(
56	owner: &signer,
57	item: Object<Item>,
58	to: address
59	) acquires Item {
60	assert!(object::owner(item) == signer::address_of(owner), E_NOT_OWNER);
61	// Safe to transfer
62	}
63
64	// ❌ WRONG: No ownership check
65	public entry fun transfer_item(
66	owner: &signer,
67	item: Object<Item>,
68	to: address
69	) acquires Item {
70	// Anyone can transfer any item!
71	}
72	```
73
74	### Step 3: Input Validation Audit
75
76	Verify:
77
78	- [ ] Numeric inputs checked for zero: `assert!(amount > 0, E_ZERO_AMOUNT)`
79	- [ ] Numeric inputs within max limits: `assert!(amount <= MAX, E_AMOUNT_TOO_HIGH)`
80	- [ ] Vector lengths validated: `assert!(vector::length(&v) > 0, E_EMPTY_VECTOR)`
81	- [ ] String lengths checked: `assert!(string::length(&s) <= MAX_LENGTH, E_NAME_TOO_LONG)`
82	- [ ] Addresses validated: `assert!(addr != @0x0, E_ZERO_ADDRESS)`
83	- [ ] Enum-like values in range: `assert!(type_id < MAX_TYPES, E_INVALID_TYPE)`
84
85	Check for:
86
87	```move
88	// ✅ CORRECT: Comprehensive validation
89	public entry fun deposit(user: &signer, amount: u64) acquires Account {
90	assert!(amount > 0, E_ZERO_AMOUNT);
91	assert!(amount <= MAX_DEPOSIT_AMOUNT, E_AMOUNT_TOO_HIGH);
92
93	let account = borrow_global_mut<Account>(signer::address_of(user));
94	assert!(account.balance <= MAX_U64 - amount, E_OVERFLOW);
95
96	account.balance = account.balance + amount;
97	}
98
99	// ❌ WRONG: No validation
100	public entry fun deposit(user: &signer, amount: u64) acquires Account {
101	let account = borrow_global_mut<Account>(signer::address_of(user));
102	account.balance = account.balance + amount; // Can overflow!
103	}
104	```
105
106	### Step 4: Object Safety Audit
107
108	Verify:
109
110	- [ ] ConstructorRef never returned from public functions
111	- [ ] All refs (TransferRef, DeleteRef, ExtendRef) generated in constructor
112	- [ ] Object signer only used during construction or with ExtendRef
113	- [ ] Ungated transfers disabled unless explicitly needed
114	- [ ] DeleteRef only generated for truly burnable objects
115
116	Check for:
117
118	```move
119	// ❌ DANGEROUS: Returning ConstructorRef
120	public fun create_item(): ConstructorRef {
121	let constructor_ref = object::create_object(@my_addr);
122	constructor_ref // Caller can destroy object!
123	}
124
125	// ✅ CORRECT: Return Object<T>
126	public fun create_item(creator: &signer): Object<Item> {
127	let constructor_ref = object::create_object(signer::address_of(creator));
128
129	let transfer_ref = object::generate_transfer_ref(&constructor_ref);
130	let delete_ref = object::generate_delete_ref(&constructor_ref);
131	let object_signer = object::generate_signer(&constructor_ref);
132
133	move_to(&object_signer, Item { transfer_ref, delete_ref });
134
135	object::object_from_constructor_ref<Item>(&constructor_ref)
136	}
137	```
138
139	### Step 5: Reference Safety Audit
140
141	Verify:
142
143	- [ ] No `&mut` references exposed in public function signatures
144	- [ ] Critical fields protected from `mem::swap`
145	- [ ] Mutable borrows minimized in scope
146
147	Check for:
148
149	```move
150	// ❌ DANGEROUS: Exposing mutable reference

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