$npx -y skills add briiirussell/cybersecurity-skills --skill red-team-engagementPlan, scope, and execute an authorized red-team engagement — distinct from a penetration test. Covers engagement methodology, assumed-breach scenarios, ATT&CK emulation plans, rules of engagement, deconfliction with the blue team, post-engagement debriefs, and the program-level w
| 1 | # Red Team Engagement — Authorized Adversary Emulation |
| 2 | |
| 3 | This skill is for **planning and executing an authorized red-team engagement against systems and an organization that has explicitly contracted for it**. It is distinct from a penetration test (technique-focused; see `web-pentest`) and from threat hunting (defensive; see `threat-hunting`). A red-team engagement is multi-week, objective-based, often assumed-breach, and explicitly tries to test the blue team's detect-and-respond capability — not just to find vulnerabilities. |
| 4 | |
| 5 | This is the most dual-use skill in this catalog. The skill refuses to help conduct unauthorized adversary simulation, regardless of how the request is framed. The authorization check below is enforced strictly. |
| 6 | |
| 7 | ## Authorization Check — required before any planning or execution |
| 8 | |
| 9 | Before working with this skill at all, confirm: |
| 10 | |
| 11 | 1. **Written authorization** for this specific engagement, against this specific target, signed by an executive with authority to grant it. The "get-out-of-jail" letter — a physical / digital document the team can produce if challenged |
| 12 | 2. **Defined scope** — what systems, what time windows, what techniques are in / out of scope |
| 13 | 3. **Identified target organization owns the target systems** — not a third party (vendor, customer, sub-tenant) whose authorization has not been obtained |
| 14 | 4. **Defined success criteria** — what does this engagement need to demonstrate or test |
| 15 | 5. **Identified deconfliction contact** — a single internal person who can pause / abort the engagement and answer "is this you?" when the blue team finds activity |
| 16 | 6. **Legal review on file** — engagement contract or internal authorization reviewed by counsel, including for any controlled-data exposure |
| 17 | 7. **Communication plan for unintended impact** — what happens if production is affected, how is it reported, how fast |
| 18 | |
| 19 | If any of the above is missing or unclear, **stop**. Ask the user to confirm. Do not proceed with planning, technique selection, or any execution work. |
| 20 | |
| 21 | If the user describes a target that does not appear to belong to them or to a contracted client, refuse — this is not a misunderstanding to be cleared up by adding "for educational purposes" or "in a CTF." The skill refuses to help simulate an attack on systems whose authorization is not present. |
| 22 | |
| 23 | ## What red-team engagements are for (and what they are not for) |
| 24 | |
| 25 | Red-team engagements exist to **test the security program's response capability** — not just to find vulnerabilities. A good red-team engagement answers questions like: |
| 26 | |
| 27 | - If an attacker gets initial access, how long until the blue team notices? |
| 28 | - When the blue team notices, how fast and how completely do they contain it? |
| 29 | - Are the documented incident-response procedures actually used? |
| 30 | - Do detections that exist in theory actually fire in practice? |
| 31 | - Can a determined adversary escalate to the named crown-jewel objective? |
| 32 | |
| 33 | Red-team engagements are **not for**: |
| 34 | |
| 35 | - Vulnerability discovery — pentests do that with much less overhead |
| 36 | - Compliance check-box — engagements are designed to teach, not to pass |
| 37 | - Performance reviews — using a red-team engagement to evaluate individual blue-team employees creates incentive problems that distort everyone's behavior |
| 38 | |
| 39 | If the goal is "find vulnerabilities," use `web-pentest` or the relevant audit skill. If the goal is "test whether our detection and response actually works," this is the right skill. |
| 40 | |
| 41 | ## Engagement model — three flavors |
| 42 | |
| 43 | | Model | Description | When to use | |
| 44 | |---|---|---| |
| 45 | | **External red team** | Engagement starts from outside the perimeter; no initial foothold | Mature programs testing the full attack chain end-to-end | |
| 46 | | **Assumed breach** | Engagement starts from a granted initial foothold (workstation, credentials, low-privilege account) | When the perimeter is well-tested already and the question is post-compromise containment | |
| 47 | | **Purple team** | Red and blue work side-by-side; red executes technique, blue verifies detection live | Early in detection-engineering maturity; high learning rate | |
| 48 | |
| 49 | Assumed-breach is the most common modern engagement model — the value-per-week is highest because almost every real breach start |