$npx -y skills add meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack --skill analyzing-wiper-malwareAnalyzes destructive wiper malware by identifying raw-disk and MBR/VBR overwrite
| 1 | # Analyzing Wiper Malware |
| 2 | |
| 3 | ## When to Use |
| 4 | |
| 5 | - You have a sample suspected of destructive intent and need to identify disk-overwrite, MBR/VBR |
| 6 | tampering, and mass-deletion primitives. |
| 7 | - You must distinguish a wiper (irreversible destruction) from ransomware (encryption for ransom). |
| 8 | |
| 9 | **Do not use** this on a live host or by running the sample — destructive behavior is the threat. |
| 10 | Analyze statically in isolation. |
| 11 | |
| 12 | ## Prerequisites |
| 13 | |
| 14 | - The sample, read inertly. |
| 15 | |
| 16 | ## Safety & Handling |
| 17 | |
| 18 | - Read bytes statically; never execute. A wiper run is unrecoverable — isolation is mandatory. |
| 19 | |
| 20 | ## Workflow |
| 21 | |
| 22 | ### Step 1: Detect destructive primitives |
| 23 | |
| 24 | ```bash |
| 25 | python scripts/analyst.py scan sample.bin |
| 26 | ``` |
| 27 | |
| 28 | Flags raw-disk handles (`\\.\PhysicalDrive`, `\\.\C:`), `DeviceIoControl`, MBR/VBR write patterns, |
| 29 | `CreateFileMapping` over the boot sector, and bulk `DeleteFile`/overwrite loops. |
| 30 | |
| 31 | ### Step 2: Detect backup/recovery destruction |
| 32 | |
| 33 | Surface `vssadmin delete shadows`, `wbadmin delete`, `bcdedit /set recoveryenabled no`, and |
| 34 | `wevtutil cl` (log clearing) — common wiper recovery-denial steps. |
| 35 | |
| 36 | ### Step 3: Distinguish wiper vs ransomware |
| 37 | |
| 38 | Weigh destruction-without-crypto and absence of a ransom note / key exchange against |
| 39 | encryption-and-extortion indicators to classify intent. |
| 40 | |
| 41 | ### Step 4: Document |
| 42 | |
| 43 | Record the destruction method (overwrite pattern, MBR vs file-level) and recovery-denial steps. |
| 44 | |
| 45 | ## Validation |
| 46 | |
| 47 | - Destructive primitives reference real raw-disk/boot-record APIs, not generic file IO. |
| 48 | - Recovery-denial commands are detected where present. |
| 49 | - The wiper-vs-ransomware classification cites concrete evidence. |
| 50 | |
| 51 | ## Pitfalls |
| 52 | |
| 53 | - Disk utilities and secure-erase tools share these primitives — context is essential. |
| 54 | - Pseudo-ransomware wipers that display a note but cannot decrypt (intent is destruction). |
| 55 | - Bootloader-only wipers needing boot-sector analysis (pair with the rootkit/bootkit skill). |
| 56 | |
| 57 | ## References |
| 58 | |
| 59 | - See [`references/api-reference.md`](references/api-reference.md) for the scanner. |
| 60 | - ATT&CK T1561 and T1485 (linked in frontmatter). |