dependency-confusion

Name: dependency-confusion
Author: Prohao42

91stars8forks

How to install dependency-confusion?

prohao42/aimy-skill/dependency-confusion

$npx -y skills add Prohao42/aimy-skill --skill dependency-confusion

Installs into the current project.

Summary

--- name: dependency-confusion description: >- Supply-chain testing via package-manager dependency confusion: when internal package names resolve to attacker-controlled public registries, leading to malicious install and script execution. Use for npm/pip/gem/Maven/Composer/D

Files · 1

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SKILL.md

1	# SKILL: Dependency Confusion — Supply Chain Attack Playbook
2
3	> AI LOAD INSTRUCTION: Expert dependency-confusion methodology. Covers how private package names leak, how public registries can win version resolution, ecosystem-specific pitfalls (npm scopes, pip extra indexes, Maven repo order), recon commands, non-destructive PoC patterns (callbacks, not data exfil), and defensive controls. Pair with supply-chain recon workflows when manifests or CI caches are in scope. Only use on systems and programs you are authorized to test.
4
5	## 0. QUICK START
6
7	What to look for first
8
9	- Manifests listing package names that look internal (short unscoped names, org-specific tokens, product codenames) without a hard-private registry lock.
10	- Evidence the same name might exist—or be squattable—on a public registry with a higher semver than the private feed publishes.
11	- Lockfiles missing, stale, or not enforced in CI so `install`/`build` can drift toward public metadata.
12
13	Fast mental model: If the resolver can see both private and public indexes, and version ranges allow it, the “newest” matching version may be the attacker’s.
14
15	Routing note: if the task comes from supply-chain, repository exposure, or CI-build recon, first use `recon-for-sec` to list internal package names and possible public-registry collisions.
16
17	---
18
19	## 1. CORE CONCEPT
20
21	1. Private packages: An organization ships libraries only on an internal registry (or under conventions that imply “ours”), e.g. a scoped name like `@org-scope/internal-utils` or an unscoped name such as `acme-billing-sdk`.
22	2. Attacker squats the name: The same package name is published on a public registry (npmjs, PyPI, RubyGems, etc.).
23	3. Resolver preference: Many setups resolve highest matching version across all configured indexes (or merge metadata), so a public `9.9.9` can beat a private `1.2.3` if ranges allow.
24	4. Execution: Package managers run lifecycle scripts (npm `preinstall`/`postinstall`, setuptools entry points, etc.) → attacker code runs on developer laptops, CI, or production image builds.
25
26	This is a supply-chain class issue: impact is often broad (many consumers) and silent until build or runtime hooks fire.
27
28	---
29
30	## 2. AFFECTED ECOSYSTEMS
31
32	\| Ecosystem \| Typical manifest \| Confusion angle \|
33	\|-----------\|------------------\|-----------------\|
34	\| npm \| `package.json` \| Scoped packages (`@scope/pkg`) are safer when the scope is owned on the registry; unscoped private-style names are high risk. Multiple registries / `.npmrc` `registry` vs per-scope `@scope:registry=` misconfiguration increases risk. \|
35	\| pip \| `requirements.txt`, `pyproject.toml`, `setup.py` \| `pip install -i` / `--extra-index-url` merges indexes; a public index can serve a higher version for the same distribution name. \|
36	\| RubyGems \| `Gemfile` \| `source` order and additional sources; ambiguous gem names reachable from rubygems.org. \|
37	\| Maven \| `pom.xml` \| Repository declaration order and mirror settings; a public repo publishing the same `groupId:artifactId` under a higher version can win if policy allows. \|
38	\| Composer \| `composer.json` \| Packagist is default; private packages without `repositories`/`canonical` discipline may collide with public names. \|
39	\| Docker \| `FROM`, image tags \| Typosquatting on container registries (e.g. public hub) for images with names similar to internal base images. \|
40
41	---
42
43	## 3. RECONNAISSANCE
44
45	Where internal names leak
46
47	- Committed `package.json`, `requirements.txt`, `Gemfile`, `pom.xml`, `composer.json` in repos or forks.
48	- JavaScript source maps, bundled assets, or error stack traces referencing package paths.
49	- `.npmrc`, `.pypirc`, CI logs showing install URLs or mirror endpoints.
50	- Issue trackers, gist snippets, and dependency graphs from SBOM exports.
51
52	Check public squatting / claimability (read-only)
53
54	```bash
55	# npm — metadata for a name (unscoped)
56	npm view some-internal-package-name version
57
58	# npm — scoped (requires scope to exist / be readable)
59	npm view @some-scope/internal-lib versions --json
60
61	# PyPI — dry-run style version probe (adjust name; fails if not found)
62	python3 -m pip install --dry-run 'some-internal-package-name==99.99.99'
63
64	# RubyGems — query remote
65	gem search '^some-internal-package-name$' --remote
66
67	# Maven Central — search coordinates (example pattern)
68	# curl "https://search.maven.org/solrsearch/select?q=g:co

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Type

dependency-confusion

91stars8forks

View on GitHub

How to install dependency-confusion?

prohao42/aimy-skill/dependency-confusion

$npx -y skills add Prohao42/aimy-skill --skill dependency-confusion

Installs into the current project.

Summary

Files · 1

View on GitHub

SKILL.md

1	# SKILL: Dependency Confusion — Supply Chain Attack Playbook
2
3	> AI LOAD INSTRUCTION: Expert dependency-confusion methodology. Covers how private package names leak, how public registries can win version resolution, ecosystem-specific pitfalls (npm scopes, pip extra indexes, Maven repo order), recon commands, non-destructive PoC patterns (callbacks, not data exfil), and defensive controls. Pair with supply-chain recon workflows when manifests or CI caches are in scope. Only use on systems and programs you are authorized to test.
4
5	## 0. QUICK START
6
7	What to look for first
8
9	- Manifests listing package names that look internal (short unscoped names, org-specific tokens, product codenames) without a hard-private registry lock.
10	- Evidence the same name might exist—or be squattable—on a public registry with a higher semver than the private feed publishes.
11	- Lockfiles missing, stale, or not enforced in CI so `install`/`build` can drift toward public metadata.
12
13	Fast mental model: If the resolver can see both private and public indexes, and version ranges allow it, the “newest” matching version may be the attacker’s.
14
15	Routing note: if the task comes from supply-chain, repository exposure, or CI-build recon, first use `recon-for-sec` to list internal package names and possible public-registry collisions.
16
17	---
18
19	## 1. CORE CONCEPT
20
21	1. Private packages: An organization ships libraries only on an internal registry (or under conventions that imply “ours”), e.g. a scoped name like `@org-scope/internal-utils` or an unscoped name such as `acme-billing-sdk`.
22	2. Attacker squats the name: The same package name is published on a public registry (npmjs, PyPI, RubyGems, etc.).
23	3. Resolver preference: Many setups resolve highest matching version across all configured indexes (or merge metadata), so a public `9.9.9` can beat a private `1.2.3` if ranges allow.
24	4. Execution: Package managers run lifecycle scripts (npm `preinstall`/`postinstall`, setuptools entry points, etc.) → attacker code runs on developer laptops, CI, or production image builds.
25
26	This is a supply-chain class issue: impact is often broad (many consumers) and silent until build or runtime hooks fire.
27
28	---
29
30	## 2. AFFECTED ECOSYSTEMS
31
32	\| Ecosystem \| Typical manifest \| Confusion angle \|
33	\|-----------\|------------------\|-----------------\|
34	\| npm \| `package.json` \| Scoped packages (`@scope/pkg`) are safer when the scope is owned on the registry; unscoped private-style names are high risk. Multiple registries / `.npmrc` `registry` vs per-scope `@scope:registry=` misconfiguration increases risk. \|
35	\| pip \| `requirements.txt`, `pyproject.toml`, `setup.py` \| `pip install -i` / `--extra-index-url` merges indexes; a public index can serve a higher version for the same distribution name. \|
36	\| RubyGems \| `Gemfile` \| `source` order and additional sources; ambiguous gem names reachable from rubygems.org. \|
37	\| Maven \| `pom.xml` \| Repository declaration order and mirror settings; a public repo publishing the same `groupId:artifactId` under a higher version can win if policy allows. \|
38	\| Composer \| `composer.json` \| Packagist is default; private packages without `repositories`/`canonical` discipline may collide with public names. \|
39	\| Docker \| `FROM`, image tags \| Typosquatting on container registries (e.g. public hub) for images with names similar to internal base images. \|
40
41	---
42
43	## 3. RECONNAISSANCE
44
45	Where internal names leak
46
47	- Committed `package.json`, `requirements.txt`, `Gemfile`, `pom.xml`, `composer.json` in repos or forks.
48	- JavaScript source maps, bundled assets, or error stack traces referencing package paths.
49	- `.npmrc`, `.pypirc`, CI logs showing install URLs or mirror endpoints.
50	- Issue trackers, gist snippets, and dependency graphs from SBOM exports.
51
52	Check public squatting / claimability (read-only)
53
54	```bash
55	# npm — metadata for a name (unscoped)
56	npm view some-internal-package-name version
57
58	# npm — scoped (requires scope to exist / be readable)
59	npm view @some-scope/internal-lib versions --json
60
61	# PyPI — dry-run style version probe (adjust name; fails if not found)
62	python3 -m pip install --dry-run 'some-internal-package-name==99.99.99'
63
64	# RubyGems — query remote
65	gem search '^some-internal-package-name$' --remote
66
67	# Maven Central — search coordinates (example pattern)
68	# curl "https://search.maven.org/solrsearch/select?q=g:co

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6 picks

Type