macos-security-bypass

Name: macos-security-bypass
Author: Prohao42

91stars8forks

How to install macos-security-bypass?

prohao42/aimy-skill/macos-security-bypass

$npx -y skills add Prohao42/aimy-skill --skill macos-security-bypass

Installs into the current project.

Summary

macOS security bypass playbook. Use when targeting macOS endpoints and need to bypass TCC, Gatekeeper, SIP, sandbox, code signing, or entitlement-based protections during authorized red team or pentest engagements.

Files · 1

View on GitHub

SKILL.md

1	# SKILL: macOS Security Bypass — Expert Attack Playbook
2
3	> AI LOAD INSTRUCTION: Expert macOS security bypass techniques. Covers TCC bypass, Gatekeeper evasion, SIP restrictions, sandbox escape, and entitlement abuse. Base models miss version-specific bypass nuances and protection interaction effects.
4
5	## 0. RELATED ROUTING
6
7	Before going deep, consider loading:
8
9	- [macos-process-injection](../macos-process-injection/SKILL.md) when you need dylib injection, XPC exploitation, or Electron abuse after achieving initial access
10	- [linux-privilege-escalation](../linux-privilege-escalation/SKILL.md) for Unix-layer privesc techniques that also apply to macOS (SUID, cron, writable paths)
11	- [linux-security-bypass](../linux-security-bypass/SKILL.md) for shared Unix security bypass concepts
12
13	### Advanced Reference
14
15	Also load [TCC_BYPASS_MATRIX.md](./TCC_BYPASS_MATRIX.md) when you need:
16	- Per-macOS-version TCC bypass mapping
17	- Protection-type-specific techniques (Camera, Microphone, FDA, Automation)
18	- MDM/configuration profile abuse patterns
19
20	---
21
22	## 1. TCC (TRANSPARENCY, CONSENT, CONTROL) OVERVIEW
23
24	TCC is macOS's permission framework controlling access to sensitive resources (camera, microphone, contacts, full disk access, etc.).
25
26	### 1.1 TCC Database Locations
27
28	\| Database \| Path \| Controls \| Protection \|
29	\|---\|---\|---\|---\|
30	\| User-level \| `~/Library/Application Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db` \| Per-user consent decisions \| SIP-protected since Catalina \|
31	\| System-level \| `/Library/Application Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db` \| System-wide consent decisions \| SIP-protected \|
32	\| MDM-managed \| Via configuration profiles \| Push PPPC (Privacy Preferences Policy Control) \| Device management \|
33
34	```sql
35	-- Query TCC database (requires FDA or SIP off)
36	sqlite3 ~/Library/Application\ Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db \
37	"SELECT service, client, allowed FROM access;"
38	```
39
40	### 1.2 TCC Bypass Categories
41
42	\| Category \| Mechanism \| Typical Prerequisite \|
43	\|---\|---\|---\|
44	\| FDA app exploitation \| Piggyback on apps already granted Full Disk Access \| Write access to FDA app's bundle or plugin dir \|
45	\| Direct DB modification \| Edit TCC.db to grant consent \| SIP disabled or FDA \|
46	\| Inherited permissions \| Child process inherits parent's TCC grants \| Code execution in context of FDA-granted app \|
47	\| Automation abuse \| Apple Events / osascript to control TCC-granted app \| Automation permission (lower bar than direct TCC) \|
48	\| Mounting tricks \| Mount a crafted disk image containing modified TCC.db \| Local access, pre-Ventura \|
49	\| SQL injection in TCC \| Malformed bundle IDs triggering SQL injection in TCC subsystem \| CVE-2023-32364 and similar \|
50
51	### 1.3 Known TCC Bypass Patterns
52
53	Terminal / iTerm FDA inheritance: Terminal.app granted FDA → any command run inherits FDA → read any file.
54
55	```bash
56	# If Terminal has FDA, this reads protected files directly
57	cat ~/Library/Mail/V*/MailData/Envelope\ Index
58	cat ~/Library/Messages/chat.db
59	```
60
61	Finder automation: Automate Finder (lower permission bar) to access files in protected locations.
62
63	```applescript
64	tell application "Finder"
65	set f to POSIX file "/Users/target/Library/Mail/V9/MailData/Envelope Index"
66	duplicate f to desktop
67	end tell
68	```
69
70	System Preferences / System Settings injection: Inject into a process that already has TCC permissions by writing to its Application Scripts folder.
71
72	MDM profile abuse: PPPC profiles can pre-approve TCC permissions. Rogue MDM enrollment or compromised MDM server → push PPPC payload.
73
74	---
75
76	## 2. GATEKEEPER BYPASS
77
78	Gatekeeper blocks unsigned or unnotarized apps from executing. Core enforcement depends on the `com.apple.quarantine` extended attribute.
79
80	### 2.1 Quarantine Attribute Removal
81
82	```bash
83	# Check quarantine attribute
84	xattr -l /path/to/app
85	# Output: com.apple.quarantine: 0083;...
86
87	# Remove quarantine (requires write access)
88	xattr -d com.apple.quarantine /path/to/app
89	# Recursive for app bundles
90	xattr -rd com.apple.quarantine /path/to/MyApp.app
91	```
92
93	### 2.2 Bypass Techniques
94
95	\| Technique \| How It Works \| macOS Version \|
96	\|---\|---\|---\|
97	\| `xattr -d` removal \| Remove quarantine before execution \| All (requires local access) \|
98	\| App translocation bypass \| Apps in certain locations skip translocation \| Pre-Catalina \|
99	\| Archive tools that strip quarantine \| Some unarchiver apps don't propagate quarantine \| Varies by tool \|
100	\| Unsigned code in signed bundle \| Notarized app bundles with unsigned nested helpers \| Pre-Ventura (CVE-2022-42821) \|
101	\| Safari auto-extract + open \| Downloaded ZIP auto-extracted, app opened before quarantine fully applied \| Safari-specific, patched \|
102	\| ACL abuse \| `com.apple.quarantine` can be blocked by ACLs set before download \| Requires pre-positioning \|
103	\| Disk image (DMG) tricks

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macos-security-bypass

91stars8forks

View on GitHub

How to install macos-security-bypass?

prohao42/aimy-skill/macos-security-bypass

$npx -y skills add Prohao42/aimy-skill --skill macos-security-bypass

Installs into the current project.

Summary

Files · 1

View on GitHub

SKILL.md

1	# SKILL: macOS Security Bypass — Expert Attack Playbook
2
3	> AI LOAD INSTRUCTION: Expert macOS security bypass techniques. Covers TCC bypass, Gatekeeper evasion, SIP restrictions, sandbox escape, and entitlement abuse. Base models miss version-specific bypass nuances and protection interaction effects.
4
5	## 0. RELATED ROUTING
6
7	Before going deep, consider loading:
8
9	- [macos-process-injection](../macos-process-injection/SKILL.md) when you need dylib injection, XPC exploitation, or Electron abuse after achieving initial access
10	- [linux-privilege-escalation](../linux-privilege-escalation/SKILL.md) for Unix-layer privesc techniques that also apply to macOS (SUID, cron, writable paths)
11	- [linux-security-bypass](../linux-security-bypass/SKILL.md) for shared Unix security bypass concepts
12
13	### Advanced Reference
14
15	Also load [TCC_BYPASS_MATRIX.md](./TCC_BYPASS_MATRIX.md) when you need:
16	- Per-macOS-version TCC bypass mapping
17	- Protection-type-specific techniques (Camera, Microphone, FDA, Automation)
18	- MDM/configuration profile abuse patterns
19
20	---
21
22	## 1. TCC (TRANSPARENCY, CONSENT, CONTROL) OVERVIEW
23
24	TCC is macOS's permission framework controlling access to sensitive resources (camera, microphone, contacts, full disk access, etc.).
25
26	### 1.1 TCC Database Locations
27
28	\| Database \| Path \| Controls \| Protection \|
29	\|---\|---\|---\|---\|
30	\| User-level \| `~/Library/Application Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db` \| Per-user consent decisions \| SIP-protected since Catalina \|
31	\| System-level \| `/Library/Application Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db` \| System-wide consent decisions \| SIP-protected \|
32	\| MDM-managed \| Via configuration profiles \| Push PPPC (Privacy Preferences Policy Control) \| Device management \|
33
34	```sql
35	-- Query TCC database (requires FDA or SIP off)
36	sqlite3 ~/Library/Application\ Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db \
37	"SELECT service, client, allowed FROM access;"
38	```
39
40	### 1.2 TCC Bypass Categories
41
42	\| Category \| Mechanism \| Typical Prerequisite \|
43	\|---\|---\|---\|
44	\| FDA app exploitation \| Piggyback on apps already granted Full Disk Access \| Write access to FDA app's bundle or plugin dir \|
45	\| Direct DB modification \| Edit TCC.db to grant consent \| SIP disabled or FDA \|
46	\| Inherited permissions \| Child process inherits parent's TCC grants \| Code execution in context of FDA-granted app \|
47	\| Automation abuse \| Apple Events / osascript to control TCC-granted app \| Automation permission (lower bar than direct TCC) \|
48	\| Mounting tricks \| Mount a crafted disk image containing modified TCC.db \| Local access, pre-Ventura \|
49	\| SQL injection in TCC \| Malformed bundle IDs triggering SQL injection in TCC subsystem \| CVE-2023-32364 and similar \|
50
51	### 1.3 Known TCC Bypass Patterns
52
53	Terminal / iTerm FDA inheritance: Terminal.app granted FDA → any command run inherits FDA → read any file.
54
55	```bash
56	# If Terminal has FDA, this reads protected files directly
57	cat ~/Library/Mail/V*/MailData/Envelope\ Index
58	cat ~/Library/Messages/chat.db
59	```
60
61	Finder automation: Automate Finder (lower permission bar) to access files in protected locations.
62
63	```applescript
64	tell application "Finder"
65	set f to POSIX file "/Users/target/Library/Mail/V9/MailData/Envelope Index"
66	duplicate f to desktop
67	end tell
68	```
69
70	System Preferences / System Settings injection: Inject into a process that already has TCC permissions by writing to its Application Scripts folder.
71
72	MDM profile abuse: PPPC profiles can pre-approve TCC permissions. Rogue MDM enrollment or compromised MDM server → push PPPC payload.
73
74	---
75
76	## 2. GATEKEEPER BYPASS
77
78	Gatekeeper blocks unsigned or unnotarized apps from executing. Core enforcement depends on the `com.apple.quarantine` extended attribute.
79
80	### 2.1 Quarantine Attribute Removal
81
82	```bash
83	# Check quarantine attribute
84	xattr -l /path/to/app
85	# Output: com.apple.quarantine: 0083;...
86
87	# Remove quarantine (requires write access)
88	xattr -d com.apple.quarantine /path/to/app
89	# Recursive for app bundles
90	xattr -rd com.apple.quarantine /path/to/MyApp.app
91	```
92
93	### 2.2 Bypass Techniques
94
95	\| Technique \| How It Works \| macOS Version \|
96	\|---\|---\|---\|
97	\| `xattr -d` removal \| Remove quarantine before execution \| All (requires local access) \|
98	\| App translocation bypass \| Apps in certain locations skip translocation \| Pre-Catalina \|
99	\| Archive tools that strip quarantine \| Some unarchiver apps don't propagate quarantine \| Varies by tool \|
100	\| Unsigned code in signed bundle \| Notarized app bundles with unsigned nested helpers \| Pre-Ventura (CVE-2022-42821) \|
101	\| Safari auto-extract + open \| Downloaded ZIP auto-extracted, app opened before quarantine fully applied \| Safari-specific, patched \|
102	\| ACL abuse \| `com.apple.quarantine` can be blocked by ACLs set before download \| Requires pre-positioning \|
103	\| Disk image (DMG) tricks

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6 picks

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