oracle-flashloan-analysis

Name: oracle-flashloan-analysis
Author: quillai-network

114stars23forks

How to install oracle-flashloan-analysis?

quillai-network/quillshield_skills/oracle-flashloan-analysis

$npx -y skills add quillai-network/quillshield_skills --skill oracle-flashloan-analysis

Installs into the current project.

Summary

Detects price oracle manipulation and flash loan attack vectors in DeFi smart contracts. Classifies oracle trust models (Chainlink, TWAP, spot price, custom), identifies stale price risks, circular price dependencies, and flash loan atomicity exploitation patterns. Use when audit

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SKILL.md

1	# Oracle & Flash Loan Analysis
2
3	Detect vulnerabilities where external price data can be manipulated or flash loans can exploit protocol logic within a single transaction. These two attack vectors are often combined and represent the most common DeFi attack pattern.
4
5	## When to Use
6
7	- Auditing any DeFi protocol that reads external price data (lending, DEX, derivatives, yield aggregators)
8	- Reviewing Chainlink, Uniswap TWAP, Band Protocol, or custom oracle integrations
9	- Analyzing protocols that interact with or are accessible via flash loans
10	- Threat modeling for MEV, sandwich attacks, and price manipulation
11	- When a protocol uses `balanceOf()`, pool reserves, or spot prices for critical calculations
12
13	## When NOT to Use
14
15	- Contracts with no price dependencies or external data feeds
16	- Pure access control analysis (use semantic-guard-analysis)
17	- State-to-state invariant checking (use state-invariant-detection)
18
19	## Core Concept: The Oracle Trust Hierarchy
20
21	Not all price sources are equally secure. Oracle vulnerabilities stem from the gap between assumed trust and actual manipulation resistance.
22
23	```
24	Trust Level (highest to lowest):
25	┌─────────────────────────────────────────────┐
26	│ Level 5: Multi-oracle consensus + circuit │
27	│ breakers + TWAP + staleness checks │
28	├─────────────────────────────────────────────┤
29	│ Level 4: Chainlink with full validation │
30	│ (staleness, sequencer, min answers) │
31	├─────────────────────────────────────────────┤
32	│ Level 3: Uniswap V3 TWAP (long window) │
33	│ Multi-block manipulation cost │
34	├─────────────────────────────────────────────┤
35	│ Level 2: Uniswap V2 TWAP (short window) │
36	│ or Chainlink WITHOUT staleness check │
37	├─────────────────────────────────────────────┤
38	│ Level 1: Spot price from single pool │ ← Manipulable via flash loan
39	│ or balanceOf() for pricing │
40	└─────────────────────────────────────────────┘
41	```
42
43	## The Four-Phase Detection Architecture
44
45	### Phase 1: Oracle Source Identification
46
47	Locate every point where the contract reads external price/value data.
48
49	Search for these patterns:
50
51	\| Pattern \| Oracle Type \| Risk Level \|
52	\|---------\|------------\|------------\|
53	\| `latestRoundData()` \| Chainlink \| Medium (depends on validation) \|
54	\| `latestAnswer()` \| Chainlink (deprecated) \| HIGH (no round validation) \|
55	\| `observe()` / `consult()` \| Uniswap TWAP \| Medium (depends on window) \|
56	\| `getReserves()` \| AMM spot price \| CRITICAL (flash-loan manipulable) \|
57	\| `balanceOf(address(this))` \| Self-balance \| CRITICAL (donation attack) \|
58	\| `slot0()` / `sqrtPriceX96` \| Uniswap V3 spot \| CRITICAL (single-block manipulable) \|
59	\| Custom `getPrice()` \| Unknown \| Requires investigation \|
60
61	Build an Oracle Dependency Map:
62
63	```
64	Contract: LendingPool
65	├── borrowLimit() → uses getCollateralPrice()
66	│ └── getCollateralPrice() → calls chainlinkOracle.latestRoundData()
67	├── liquidate() → uses getDebtPrice()
68	│ └── getDebtPrice() → calls uniswapPool.slot0() ← SPOT PRICE!
69	└── calculateInterest() → uses getUtilizationRate()
70	└── getUtilizationRate() → reads internal state (safe)
71	```
72
73	### Phase 2: Oracle Validation Verification
74
75	For each oracle source, verify that proper safety checks are in place.
76
77	Chainlink Validation Checklist:
78
79	```solidity
80	// COMPLETE Chainlink integration
81	(uint80 roundId, int256 price, , uint256 updatedAt, uint80 answeredInRound) =
82	priceFeed.latestRoundData();
83
84	require(price > 0, "Invalid price"); // Check 1: Non-negative
85	require(updatedAt > 0, "Round not complete"); // Check 2: Round complete
86	require(answeredInRound >= roundId, "Stale price"); // Check 3: Not stale
87	require(block.timestamp - updatedAt < HEARTBEAT, // Check 4: Fresh
88	"Price too old");
89
90	// L2-specific
91	require(!sequencerFeed.isDown(), "Sequencer down"); // Check 5: L2 sequencer
92	require(block.timestamp - sequencerUptime > GRACE, // Check 6: Grace period
93	"Grace period");
94	```
95
96	Missing Check Severity:
97
98	\| Missing Check \| Severity \| Impact \|
99	\|---------------\|----------\|--------\|
100	\| `price > 0` \| HIGH \| Zero/negative price → infinite borrowing or free liquidations \|
101	\| `updatedAt > 0` \| MEDIUM \| Incomplete round data used \|
102	\| `answeredInRound >= roundId` \| HIGH \| Stale price from previous round \|
103	\| Heartbeat/freshness \| HIGH \| Hours-old price during volatile markets \|
104	\| L2 sequencer check \| HIGH \| Stale price dur

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oracle-flashloan-analysis

114stars23forks

View on GitHub

How to install oracle-flashloan-analysis?

quillai-network/quillshield_skills/oracle-flashloan-analysis

$npx -y skills add quillai-network/quillshield_skills --skill oracle-flashloan-analysis

Installs into the current project.

Summary

Files · 1

View on GitHub

SKILL.md

1	# Oracle & Flash Loan Analysis
2
3	Detect vulnerabilities where external price data can be manipulated or flash loans can exploit protocol logic within a single transaction. These two attack vectors are often combined and represent the most common DeFi attack pattern.
4
5	## When to Use
6
7	- Auditing any DeFi protocol that reads external price data (lending, DEX, derivatives, yield aggregators)
8	- Reviewing Chainlink, Uniswap TWAP, Band Protocol, or custom oracle integrations
9	- Analyzing protocols that interact with or are accessible via flash loans
10	- Threat modeling for MEV, sandwich attacks, and price manipulation
11	- When a protocol uses `balanceOf()`, pool reserves, or spot prices for critical calculations
12
13	## When NOT to Use
14
15	- Contracts with no price dependencies or external data feeds
16	- Pure access control analysis (use semantic-guard-analysis)
17	- State-to-state invariant checking (use state-invariant-detection)
18
19	## Core Concept: The Oracle Trust Hierarchy
20
21	Not all price sources are equally secure. Oracle vulnerabilities stem from the gap between assumed trust and actual manipulation resistance.
22
23	```
24	Trust Level (highest to lowest):
25	┌─────────────────────────────────────────────┐
26	│ Level 5: Multi-oracle consensus + circuit │
27	│ breakers + TWAP + staleness checks │
28	├─────────────────────────────────────────────┤
29	│ Level 4: Chainlink with full validation │
30	│ (staleness, sequencer, min answers) │
31	├─────────────────────────────────────────────┤
32	│ Level 3: Uniswap V3 TWAP (long window) │
33	│ Multi-block manipulation cost │
34	├─────────────────────────────────────────────┤
35	│ Level 2: Uniswap V2 TWAP (short window) │
36	│ or Chainlink WITHOUT staleness check │
37	├─────────────────────────────────────────────┤
38	│ Level 1: Spot price from single pool │ ← Manipulable via flash loan
39	│ or balanceOf() for pricing │
40	└─────────────────────────────────────────────┘
41	```
42
43	## The Four-Phase Detection Architecture
44
45	### Phase 1: Oracle Source Identification
46
47	Locate every point where the contract reads external price/value data.
48
49	Search for these patterns:
50
51	\| Pattern \| Oracle Type \| Risk Level \|
52	\|---------\|------------\|------------\|
53	\| `latestRoundData()` \| Chainlink \| Medium (depends on validation) \|
54	\| `latestAnswer()` \| Chainlink (deprecated) \| HIGH (no round validation) \|
55	\| `observe()` / `consult()` \| Uniswap TWAP \| Medium (depends on window) \|
56	\| `getReserves()` \| AMM spot price \| CRITICAL (flash-loan manipulable) \|
57	\| `balanceOf(address(this))` \| Self-balance \| CRITICAL (donation attack) \|
58	\| `slot0()` / `sqrtPriceX96` \| Uniswap V3 spot \| CRITICAL (single-block manipulable) \|
59	\| Custom `getPrice()` \| Unknown \| Requires investigation \|
60
61	Build an Oracle Dependency Map:
62
63	```
64	Contract: LendingPool
65	├── borrowLimit() → uses getCollateralPrice()
66	│ └── getCollateralPrice() → calls chainlinkOracle.latestRoundData()
67	├── liquidate() → uses getDebtPrice()
68	│ └── getDebtPrice() → calls uniswapPool.slot0() ← SPOT PRICE!
69	└── calculateInterest() → uses getUtilizationRate()
70	└── getUtilizationRate() → reads internal state (safe)
71	```
72
73	### Phase 2: Oracle Validation Verification
74
75	For each oracle source, verify that proper safety checks are in place.
76
77	Chainlink Validation Checklist:
78
79	```solidity
80	// COMPLETE Chainlink integration
81	(uint80 roundId, int256 price, , uint256 updatedAt, uint80 answeredInRound) =
82	priceFeed.latestRoundData();
83
84	require(price > 0, "Invalid price"); // Check 1: Non-negative
85	require(updatedAt > 0, "Round not complete"); // Check 2: Round complete
86	require(answeredInRound >= roundId, "Stale price"); // Check 3: Not stale
87	require(block.timestamp - updatedAt < HEARTBEAT, // Check 4: Fresh
88	"Price too old");
89
90	// L2-specific
91	require(!sequencerFeed.isDown(), "Sequencer down"); // Check 5: L2 sequencer
92	require(block.timestamp - sequencerUptime > GRACE, // Check 6: Grace period
93	"Grace period");
94	```
95
96	Missing Check Severity:
97
98	\| Missing Check \| Severity \| Impact \|
99	\|---------------\|----------\|--------\|
100	\| `price > 0` \| HIGH \| Zero/negative price → infinite borrowing or free liquidations \|
101	\| `updatedAt > 0` \| MEDIUM \| Incomplete round data used \|
102	\| `answeredInRound >= roundId` \| HIGH \| Stale price from previous round \|
103	\| Heartbeat/freshness \| HIGH \| Hours-old price during volatile markets \|
104	\| L2 sequencer check \| HIGH \| Stale price dur

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