offensive-deserialization

Name: offensive-deserialization
Author: SnailSploit

2.8kstars447forks

How to install offensive-deserialization?

snailsploit/claude-red/offensive-deserialization

$npx -y skills add SnailSploit/Claude-Red --skill offensive-deserialization

Installs into the current project.

Summary

When this skill is active: 1. Load and apply the full methodology below as your operational checklist 2. Follow steps in order unless the user specifies otherwise 3. For each technique, consider applicability to the current target/context 4. Track which checklist items have been

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SKILL.md

1	# SKILL: Insecure Deserialization
2
3	## Metadata
4	- Skill Name: insecure-deserialization
5	- Folder: offensive-deserialization
6	- Source: https://github.com/SnailSploit/offensive-checklist/blob/main/insecure-deserialization.md
7
8	## Description
9	Insecure deserialization attack checklist: identifying deserialization sinks, Java/PHP/.NET/Python deserialization exploitation, ysoserial gadget chains, magic method abuse, and detection evasion. Use when testing deserialization endpoints or developing deserialization exploits.
10
11	## Trigger Phrases
12	Use this skill when the conversation involves any of:
13	`deserialization, insecure deserialization, ysoserial, Java deserialization, PHP deserialization, .NET deserialization, pickle, gadget chain, magic method, ObjectInputStream`
14
15	## Instructions for Claude
16
17	When this skill is active:
18	1. Load and apply the full methodology below as your operational checklist
19	2. Follow steps in order unless the user specifies otherwise
20	3. For each technique, consider applicability to the current target/context
21	4. Track which checklist items have been completed
22	5. Suggest next steps based on findings
23
24	---
25
26	## Full Methodology
27
28	# Insecure Deserialization
29
30	Happens when applications deserialize program objects without proper precaution. An attacker can then manipulate serialized objects to change program behavior and even execute code.
31
32	## Shortcut
33
34	1. Search source for deserialization that touches user input.
35	2. If black-box, look for large, opaque blobs (cookies, headers, bodies) and unusual content-types.
36	3. Identify features that must deserialize user-supplied data (session, jobs/queues, file metadata, tokens).
37	4. If identity is embedded, tamper to attempt auth bypass.
38	5. Try to escalate to RCE/logic abuse carefully and non-destructively.
39
40	## Mechanisms
41
42	- Occurs when user-controlled data is deserialized without strict allowlists and integrity checks. Exploits often occur during deserialization (magic methods, constructors), before app logic runs.
43	- Prefer data formats that don’t instantiate code (JSON), and disable polymorphic typing.
44
45	## Hunt
46
47	1. Identify Potential Inputs:
48	- HTTP parameters/headers/cookies, file uploads, message queues, caches, DB‑stored user content
49	2. Recognize Serialized Data:
50	- PHP: `O:<len>:"Class":...` (often Base64), PHAR archives (`phar://`)
51	- Java: hex `ac ed 00 05` or Base64 `rO0`; XMLDecoder/XStream flows
52	- .NET: legacy `BinaryFormatter`/`SoapFormatter` (unsafe/deprecated); Base64 `AAEAAAD/////`
53	- Python: `pickle` opcodes; unsafe `yaml.load` without `SafeLoader`
54	- Ruby: `YAML.load` unsafe; use `safe_load`
55	3. Source Review (if available):
56	- Java: `ObjectInputStream.readObject`; enable `ObjectInputFilter`, disable Jackson default typing; use allowlists
57	- PHP: `unserialize()`; file operations that dereference `phar://`
58	- .NET: avoid `BinaryFormatter`; use `System.Text.Json`
59	- Python: avoid `pickle` for untrusted data; `yaml.safe_load`
60	- Node.js: `node-serialize`, `serialize-javascript`, `funcster` with unsafe eval()
61	- Golang: `encoding/gob` with interface{} type confusion
62	- Ruby: `Marshal.load()`, `YAML.load()` without `safe_load`
63	- Rust: `serde` with YAML/bincode, `ron` (Rusty Object Notation)
64	4. Dynamic Analysis: Intercept and mutate; watch for error stack traces, class names, and timing anomalies.
65
66	## Bypass Techniques
67
68	1. Alternate Gadgets/Classes: Switch payload chains if blocklists are present.
69	2. Type Confusion: Change expected types to bypass weak validation.
70	3. Indirect Paths: Sink data into storage that a different component later deserializes.
71	4. Format Specific: PHAR wrappers, XML entity tricks, language‑specific unserialize quirks.
72	5. Post‑deserialization Impact: Abuse magic methods that run before validation.
73
74	## Language-Specific Details
75
76	### Node.js
77
78	- node-serialize: RCE via `_$$ND_FUNC$$_` IIFE pattern
79	```javascript
80	{"rce":"_$$ND_FUNC$$_function(){require('child_process').exec('whoami', function(error, stdout){console.log(stdout)});}()"}
81	```
82	- serialize-javascript: Unsafe eval() when not properly escaped
83	- funcster: Arbitrary function serialization leads to code execution
84	- Detection: Look for `{"_$$ND_FUNC$$_` or serialized function strings in cookies/tokens
85
86	### Golang
87
88	- encoding/gob: Type confusion attacks when using `interface{}` types
89	```go
90	// Vulnerable: accepts any type
91	var data interface{}
92	dec := gob.NewDecoder(buffer)
93	dec.Decode(&data)
94	```
95	- encoding/json: Generally safe but Unmarshal into `interface{}` allows unexpected types
96	- MessagePack: Unsafe reflection in `github.com/vmihailenco/msgpack` with custom decoders
97	- Mitigation: Use concrete types, avoid `interface{}` for untrusted data
98
99	### Rust
100
101	- serde: Generally memory-safe but logic bugs possible with custom `Deserialize` implementations
102	- bincode: Binary serialization -

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Type

offensive-deserialization

2.8kstars447forks

View on GitHub

How to install offensive-deserialization?

snailsploit/claude-red/offensive-deserialization

$npx -y skills add SnailSploit/Claude-Red --skill offensive-deserialization

Installs into the current project.

Summary

Files · 1

View on GitHub

SKILL.md

1	# SKILL: Insecure Deserialization
2
3	## Metadata
4	- Skill Name: insecure-deserialization
5	- Folder: offensive-deserialization
6	- Source: https://github.com/SnailSploit/offensive-checklist/blob/main/insecure-deserialization.md
7
8	## Description
9	Insecure deserialization attack checklist: identifying deserialization sinks, Java/PHP/.NET/Python deserialization exploitation, ysoserial gadget chains, magic method abuse, and detection evasion. Use when testing deserialization endpoints or developing deserialization exploits.
10
11	## Trigger Phrases
12	Use this skill when the conversation involves any of:
13	`deserialization, insecure deserialization, ysoserial, Java deserialization, PHP deserialization, .NET deserialization, pickle, gadget chain, magic method, ObjectInputStream`
14
15	## Instructions for Claude
16
17	When this skill is active:
18	1. Load and apply the full methodology below as your operational checklist
19	2. Follow steps in order unless the user specifies otherwise
20	3. For each technique, consider applicability to the current target/context
21	4. Track which checklist items have been completed
22	5. Suggest next steps based on findings
23
24	---
25
26	## Full Methodology
27
28	# Insecure Deserialization
29
30	Happens when applications deserialize program objects without proper precaution. An attacker can then manipulate serialized objects to change program behavior and even execute code.
31
32	## Shortcut
33
34	1. Search source for deserialization that touches user input.
35	2. If black-box, look for large, opaque blobs (cookies, headers, bodies) and unusual content-types.
36	3. Identify features that must deserialize user-supplied data (session, jobs/queues, file metadata, tokens).
37	4. If identity is embedded, tamper to attempt auth bypass.
38	5. Try to escalate to RCE/logic abuse carefully and non-destructively.
39
40	## Mechanisms
41
42	- Occurs when user-controlled data is deserialized without strict allowlists and integrity checks. Exploits often occur during deserialization (magic methods, constructors), before app logic runs.
43	- Prefer data formats that don’t instantiate code (JSON), and disable polymorphic typing.
44
45	## Hunt
46
47	1. Identify Potential Inputs:
48	- HTTP parameters/headers/cookies, file uploads, message queues, caches, DB‑stored user content
49	2. Recognize Serialized Data:
50	- PHP: `O:<len>:"Class":...` (often Base64), PHAR archives (`phar://`)
51	- Java: hex `ac ed 00 05` or Base64 `rO0`; XMLDecoder/XStream flows
52	- .NET: legacy `BinaryFormatter`/`SoapFormatter` (unsafe/deprecated); Base64 `AAEAAAD/////`
53	- Python: `pickle` opcodes; unsafe `yaml.load` without `SafeLoader`
54	- Ruby: `YAML.load` unsafe; use `safe_load`
55	3. Source Review (if available):
56	- Java: `ObjectInputStream.readObject`; enable `ObjectInputFilter`, disable Jackson default typing; use allowlists
57	- PHP: `unserialize()`; file operations that dereference `phar://`
58	- .NET: avoid `BinaryFormatter`; use `System.Text.Json`
59	- Python: avoid `pickle` for untrusted data; `yaml.safe_load`
60	- Node.js: `node-serialize`, `serialize-javascript`, `funcster` with unsafe eval()
61	- Golang: `encoding/gob` with interface{} type confusion
62	- Ruby: `Marshal.load()`, `YAML.load()` without `safe_load`
63	- Rust: `serde` with YAML/bincode, `ron` (Rusty Object Notation)
64	4. Dynamic Analysis: Intercept and mutate; watch for error stack traces, class names, and timing anomalies.
65
66	## Bypass Techniques
67
68	1. Alternate Gadgets/Classes: Switch payload chains if blocklists are present.
69	2. Type Confusion: Change expected types to bypass weak validation.
70	3. Indirect Paths: Sink data into storage that a different component later deserializes.
71	4. Format Specific: PHAR wrappers, XML entity tricks, language‑specific unserialize quirks.
72	5. Post‑deserialization Impact: Abuse magic methods that run before validation.
73
74	## Language-Specific Details
75
76	### Node.js
77
78	- node-serialize: RCE via `_$$ND_FUNC$$_` IIFE pattern
79	```javascript
80	{"rce":"_$$ND_FUNC$$_function(){require('child_process').exec('whoami', function(error, stdout){console.log(stdout)});}()"}
81	```
82	- serialize-javascript: Unsafe eval() when not properly escaped
83	- funcster: Arbitrary function serialization leads to code execution
84	- Detection: Look for `{"_$$ND_FUNC$$_` or serialized function strings in cookies/tokens
85
86	### Golang
87
88	- encoding/gob: Type confusion attacks when using `interface{}` types
89	```go
90	// Vulnerable: accepts any type
91	var data interface{}
92	dec := gob.NewDecoder(buffer)
93	dec.Decode(&data)
94	```
95	- encoding/json: Generally safe but Unmarshal into `interface{}` allows unexpected types
96	- MessagePack: Unsafe reflection in `github.com/vmihailenco/msgpack` with custom decoders
97	- Mitigation: Use concrete types, avoid `interface{}` for untrusted data
98
99	### Rust
100
101	- serde: Generally memory-safe but logic bugs possible with custom `Deserialize` implementations
102	- bincode: Binary serialization -

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