offensive-wpa3-sae

Name: offensive-wpa3-sae
Author: SnailSploit

2.8kstars447forks

How to install offensive-wpa3-sae?

snailsploit/claude-red/offensive-wpa3-sae

$npx -y skills add SnailSploit/Claude-Red --skill offensive-wpa3-sae

Installs into the current project.

Summary

WPA3 / SAE (Simultaneous Authentication of Equals) attack methodology — transition-mode (mixed WPA2/WPA3) downgrade, Dragonblood side-channel attacks (CVE-2019-9494, 9495, 13377, 13456), SAE auth flooding for AP CPU exhaustion, Hash-to-Element (H2E) timing analysis, group downgra

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SKILL.md

1	# WPA3 / SAE Attacks
2
3	WPA3 fixes the offline-handshake-cracking weakness of WPA2 by replacing the 4-way PSK exchange with SAE (a Dragonfly-derived password-authenticated key exchange). The straightforward offline crack disappears — but transition-mode misconfigurations and the original SAE implementation's side-channel leaks open new paths.
4
5	## Quick Workflow
6
7	1. Verify the target advertises WPA3 (RSN IE shows AKM SAE = 8)
8	2. Check for transition-mode (mixed WPA2 + WPA3) — easiest path
9	3. If pure WPA3, fingerprint the AP's hostapd version for Dragonblood applicability
10	4. Side-channel timing or cache attacks if reachable
11	5. Otherwise, accept that offline cracking isn't viable — pivot to other surfaces
12
13	---
14
15	## Transition-Mode Downgrade
16
17	If the AP advertises both WPA2-PSK and WPA3-SAE (transition mode for mixed-client networks), older clients can be forced onto WPA2:
18
19	```bash
20	# Identify transition mode in beacon frames
21	sudo airodump-ng wlan0mon -c <ch> --bssid <BSSID>
22	# Encryption column shows WPA2 WPA3 (both)
23	```
24
25	Steps:
26
27	1. Spoof a beacon advertising only RSN-WPA2 with the same BSSID/SSID
28	2. Client roams to your beacon, performs WPA2 4-way handshake
29	3. Capture handshake exactly like `offensive-wpa2-psk`
30
31	```bash
32	# Use hostapd-mana or airbase-ng for the WPA2-only AP advertisement
33	airbase-ng -e CorpWiFi -c 6 -W 1 wlan0mon
34	# -W 1 enables WPA, configure for WPA2-only RSN element
35	```
36
37	Why this works: WPA3-SAE clients fall back to WPA2-PSK if the AP only advertises WPA2 — there's no protected downgrade defense in transition mode. WPA3-only mode (no transition) blocks this.
38
39	Mitigation defenders use: WPA3-only networks (no WPA2). Wi-Fi 6E (6 GHz) mandates WPA3-only by spec.
40
41	## Dragonblood (CVE-2019-9494 / 9495 / 13377 / 13456)
42
43	Side-channel and downgrade attacks against the SAE Hunting-and-Pecking algorithm in pre-2.10 hostapd / wpa_supplicant.
44
45	### Cache-Based Side-Channel
46
47	The original SAE password-element derivation iterates a variable number of times depending on the password and MAC. Cache hits leak the iteration count.
48
49	```bash
50	git clone https://github.com/vanhoefm/dragonblood
51	cd dragonblood
52
53	# Cache-based attack (requires co-located malicious code on target host — limited)
54	python3 dragontime.py --bssid AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF --iface wlan0mon
55	```
56
57	### Timing Side-Channel
58
59	The same iteration count leaks via observable timing of the SAE commit phase from outside.
60
61	```bash
62	python3 dragontime.py --bssid AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF --iface wlan0mon --mode timing
63	```
64
65	### Downgrade to Weak Group
66
67	Some implementations accept SAE with the deprecated MODP group 5 if the client requests it. Combined with cache/timing side channels, this enables offline dictionary attack.
68
69	```bash
70	python3 dragondrain.py wlan0mon AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF
71	```
72
73	### Patched Versions
74
75	\| Implementation \| Fixed \|
76	\|---\|---\|
77	\| hostapd / wpa_supplicant \| 2.10 (April 2022) \|
78	\| Apple iOS / macOS \| 2019 patches \|
79	\| Windows \| KB-batched 2019-2020 \|
80	\| Embedded routers \| Often unpatched — high hit rate on consumer SOHO \|
81
82	## Hash-to-Element (H2E)
83
84	WPA3 R2 introduced H2E to replace the iteration-leaky Hunting-and-Pecking. H2E is constant-time. If the AP advertises H2E in the RSNXE element, Dragonblood-class attacks don't apply.
85
86	```bash
87	# Wireshark filter
88	wlan.rsnx.field.h2e
89	```
90
91	If H2E is present and required (no Hunting-and-Pecking fallback), only the spec is left to attack — abandon SAE attacks and pivot to other surfaces (PMF check, evil-twin via EAP if Enterprise, supply-chain via management frames).
92
93	## SAE Auth Flooding (DoS)
94
95	SAE's commit phase requires the AP to do heavy elliptic-curve work per association attempt. Floods can exhaust CPU on lower-end APs, denying service to legitimate clients.
96
97	```bash
98	sudo mdk4 wlan0mon a -a AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF -m -s 1024
99	# Auth attack mode -a, multiple per second -s 1024
100	```
101
102	This is a DoS — only with explicit authorization. Modern enterprise APs use anti-clogging tokens to throttle SAE-flood attacks; consumer routers often don't.
103
104	## 6 GHz / Wi-Fi 6E Implications
105
106	The 6 GHz band (Wi-Fi 6E, channels 1–233 in the 5925–7125 MHz range) requires:
107
108	- WPA3-only (no transition mode)
109	- PMF (802.11w) mandatory (deauth/disassoc protected)
110	- OWE (Opportunistic Wireless Encryption) for open networks
111
112	Net effect: most pre-WPA3 attacks (deauth, transition-mode downgrade) don't apply on 6 GHz. Pure SAE side-channel, evil-twin, or out-of-band attacks remain viable.
113
114	## Detection Consider

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offensive-wpa3-sae

2.8kstars447forks

View on GitHub

How to install offensive-wpa3-sae?

snailsploit/claude-red/offensive-wpa3-sae

$npx -y skills add SnailSploit/Claude-Red --skill offensive-wpa3-sae

Installs into the current project.

Summary

Files · 1

View on GitHub

SKILL.md

1	# WPA3 / SAE Attacks
2
3	WPA3 fixes the offline-handshake-cracking weakness of WPA2 by replacing the 4-way PSK exchange with SAE (a Dragonfly-derived password-authenticated key exchange). The straightforward offline crack disappears — but transition-mode misconfigurations and the original SAE implementation's side-channel leaks open new paths.
4
5	## Quick Workflow
6
7	1. Verify the target advertises WPA3 (RSN IE shows AKM SAE = 8)
8	2. Check for transition-mode (mixed WPA2 + WPA3) — easiest path
9	3. If pure WPA3, fingerprint the AP's hostapd version for Dragonblood applicability
10	4. Side-channel timing or cache attacks if reachable
11	5. Otherwise, accept that offline cracking isn't viable — pivot to other surfaces
12
13	---
14
15	## Transition-Mode Downgrade
16
17	If the AP advertises both WPA2-PSK and WPA3-SAE (transition mode for mixed-client networks), older clients can be forced onto WPA2:
18
19	```bash
20	# Identify transition mode in beacon frames
21	sudo airodump-ng wlan0mon -c <ch> --bssid <BSSID>
22	# Encryption column shows WPA2 WPA3 (both)
23	```
24
25	Steps:
26
27	1. Spoof a beacon advertising only RSN-WPA2 with the same BSSID/SSID
28	2. Client roams to your beacon, performs WPA2 4-way handshake
29	3. Capture handshake exactly like `offensive-wpa2-psk`
30
31	```bash
32	# Use hostapd-mana or airbase-ng for the WPA2-only AP advertisement
33	airbase-ng -e CorpWiFi -c 6 -W 1 wlan0mon
34	# -W 1 enables WPA, configure for WPA2-only RSN element
35	```
36
37	Why this works: WPA3-SAE clients fall back to WPA2-PSK if the AP only advertises WPA2 — there's no protected downgrade defense in transition mode. WPA3-only mode (no transition) blocks this.
38
39	Mitigation defenders use: WPA3-only networks (no WPA2). Wi-Fi 6E (6 GHz) mandates WPA3-only by spec.
40
41	## Dragonblood (CVE-2019-9494 / 9495 / 13377 / 13456)
42
43	Side-channel and downgrade attacks against the SAE Hunting-and-Pecking algorithm in pre-2.10 hostapd / wpa_supplicant.
44
45	### Cache-Based Side-Channel
46
47	The original SAE password-element derivation iterates a variable number of times depending on the password and MAC. Cache hits leak the iteration count.
48
49	```bash
50	git clone https://github.com/vanhoefm/dragonblood
51	cd dragonblood
52
53	# Cache-based attack (requires co-located malicious code on target host — limited)
54	python3 dragontime.py --bssid AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF --iface wlan0mon
55	```
56
57	### Timing Side-Channel
58
59	The same iteration count leaks via observable timing of the SAE commit phase from outside.
60
61	```bash
62	python3 dragontime.py --bssid AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF --iface wlan0mon --mode timing
63	```
64
65	### Downgrade to Weak Group
66
67	Some implementations accept SAE with the deprecated MODP group 5 if the client requests it. Combined with cache/timing side channels, this enables offline dictionary attack.
68
69	```bash
70	python3 dragondrain.py wlan0mon AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF
71	```
72
73	### Patched Versions
74
75	\| Implementation \| Fixed \|
76	\|---\|---\|
77	\| hostapd / wpa_supplicant \| 2.10 (April 2022) \|
78	\| Apple iOS / macOS \| 2019 patches \|
79	\| Windows \| KB-batched 2019-2020 \|
80	\| Embedded routers \| Often unpatched — high hit rate on consumer SOHO \|
81
82	## Hash-to-Element (H2E)
83
84	WPA3 R2 introduced H2E to replace the iteration-leaky Hunting-and-Pecking. H2E is constant-time. If the AP advertises H2E in the RSNXE element, Dragonblood-class attacks don't apply.
85
86	```bash
87	# Wireshark filter
88	wlan.rsnx.field.h2e
89	```
90
91	If H2E is present and required (no Hunting-and-Pecking fallback), only the spec is left to attack — abandon SAE attacks and pivot to other surfaces (PMF check, evil-twin via EAP if Enterprise, supply-chain via management frames).
92
93	## SAE Auth Flooding (DoS)
94
95	SAE's commit phase requires the AP to do heavy elliptic-curve work per association attempt. Floods can exhaust CPU on lower-end APs, denying service to legitimate clients.
96
97	```bash
98	sudo mdk4 wlan0mon a -a AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF -m -s 1024
99	# Auth attack mode -a, multiple per second -s 1024
100	```
101
102	This is a DoS — only with explicit authorization. Modern enterprise APs use anti-clogging tokens to throttle SAE-flood attacks; consumer routers often don't.
103
104	## 6 GHz / Wi-Fi 6E Implications
105
106	The 6 GHz band (Wi-Fi 6E, channels 1–233 in the 5925–7125 MHz range) requires:
107
108	- WPA3-only (no transition mode)
109	- PMF (802.11w) mandatory (deauth/disassoc protected)
110	- OWE (Opportunistic Wireless Encryption) for open networks
111
112	Net effect: most pre-WPA3 attacks (deauth, transition-mode downgrade) don't apply on 6 GHz. Pure SAE side-channel, evil-twin, or out-of-band attacks remain viable.
113
114	## Detection Consider

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Type