$npx -y skills add vinayaklatthe/microsoft-security-skills --skill azure-confidential-computingGuidance for Azure Confidential Computing — protecting data in use through hardware-based Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs). Covers Confidential VMs (AMD SEV-SNP, Intel TDX), Confidential containers on AKS (Kata + AMD SEV-SNP), confidential GPU VMs (NVIDIA H100 with TDX), Azu
| 1 | # Azure Confidential Computing |
| 2 | |
| 3 | Confidential computing is the third pillar of data protection — **data in use** — |
| 4 | complementing encryption at rest and in transit. Azure Confidential Computing uses |
| 5 | hardware-based **Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs)** so workloads run on encrypted |
| 6 | memory the host (and Microsoft) cannot inspect, with cryptographic **attestation** to |
| 7 | prove the TEE state to a remote relying party before secrets are released. |
| 8 | |
| 9 | ## When to use |
| 10 | - Multi-party data collaboration where parties must compute on each other's data |
| 11 | without seeing it (clean rooms, fraud consortia, joint analytics). |
| 12 | - Regulated workloads requiring isolation from cloud operator access (defense, certain |
| 13 | financial / healthcare scenarios). |
| 14 | - Sensitive AI training/inference where model weights or training data are crown |
| 15 | jewels. |
| 16 | - Cryptographic operations that must be hardware-rooted with attestation evidence. |
| 17 | |
| 18 | **Do not use this skill** for ordinary data-at-rest CMK (`azure-key-vault`), generic app |
| 19 | encryption, or non-Azure TEE / Intel SGX-only designs. |
| 20 | |
| 21 | ## Form factors |
| 22 | |
| 23 | | Form factor | Hardware | Best for | |
| 24 | |---|---|---| |
| 25 | | **Confidential VMs (DCasv5/ECasv5)** | AMD SEV-SNP | Lift-and-shift Linux/Windows workloads with whole-VM TEE | |
| 26 | | **Confidential VMs (DCesv5/ECesv5)** | Intel TDX | Trust-domain isolation for VMs | |
| 27 | | **Confidential containers on AKS** | Kata Containers + AMD SEV-SNP | Container workloads, per-pod TEE | |
| 28 | | **Confidential GPU VMs (NCC H100 v5)** | NVIDIA H100 + Intel TDX | Confidential AI training/inference | |
| 29 | | **App-enclave** (Intel SGX, DCsv2/3) | Intel SGX | Targeted enclaves; legacy pattern, less common in new builds | |
| 30 | | **Azure Confidential Ledger** | Hardware-backed append-only ledger | Tamper-evident audit logs | |
| 31 | |
| 32 | ## Approach |
| 33 | |
| 34 | 1. **Validate the threat model.** Confidential computing protects against: |
| 35 | - Cloud operator (host admin) memory inspection. |
| 36 | - Co-tenant side-channel reads (within hardware mitigation limits). |
| 37 | - Snapshot/disk-image exfiltration combined with memory dump. |
| 38 | It does **not** protect against application bugs, supply-chain compromise of your |
| 39 | own code, or insider access at the customer. |
| 40 | |
| 41 | 2. **Pick the right form factor.** |
| 42 | - Existing VM workload moving sensitive without code changes → **Confidential VM |
| 43 | (SEV-SNP)** is the easiest lift. |
| 44 | - K8s cluster with mixed sensitivity → **Confidential containers on AKS**, scoping |
| 45 | pods that need TEE. |
| 46 | - Confidential GPU (LLM training/inference on sensitive data) → **NCC H100 v5**. |
| 47 | - Multi-party computation with secret protocol → enclave-aware code with SGX (only |
| 48 | where you need finer-grained TEE than whole-VM). |
| 49 | |
| 50 | 3. **Stand up Microsoft Azure Attestation.** The MAA service issues signed attestation |
| 51 | tokens describing the TEE state (CPU model, firmware version, security version). |
| 52 | Relying parties (your apps, Key Vault) verify these tokens before trusting the |
| 53 | workload. |
| 54 | |
| 55 | 4. **Wire secure key release (SKR).** Azure Key Vault Premium / Managed HSM supports |
| 56 | key-release policies that gate `release` operations on a verified MAA token. The |
| 57 | workflow: |
| 58 | 1. Confidential workload requests an attestation from MAA. |
| 59 | 2. Workload presents the token to Key Vault. |
| 60 | 3. Key Vault validates against the configured policy (allowed TEE type, firmware |
| 61 | version, owner identity). |
| 62 | 4. Key is released into the TEE memory. |
| 63 | This is the foundation for "even Microsoft cannot read this key — only the right |
| 64 | workload running on the right hardware can use it." |
| 65 | |
| 66 | 5. **Confidential containers on AKS** — use the Confidential Container add-on. |
| 67 | Configure pod security with attestation-aware init containers; sensitive secrets |
| 68 | pulled via SKR after pod attestation. |
| 69 | |
| 70 | 6. **Confidential AI patterns.** Two common shapes: |
| 71 | - **Confidential inference**: model weights remain encrypted on disk; loaded into |