$npx -y skills add vinayaklatthe/microsoft-security-skills --skill bitlocker-designGuidance for designing BitLocker drive encryption for Windows endpoints managed via Microsoft Intune — encryption policy, silent enablement, recovery key escrow to Entra ID, TPM, pre-boot authentication trade-offs, and BitLocker To Go for removable media. Covers compliance integr
| 1 | # BitLocker Design |
| 2 | |
| 3 | BitLocker provides full-volume encryption for Windows devices, protecting data at rest against |
| 4 | device loss or theft. In cloud-managed estates it is deployed and monitored through Intune |
| 5 | **disk encryption** endpoint security policies with recovery key escrow to Microsoft Entra ID. |
| 6 | |
| 7 | ## When to use |
| 8 | Encrypting Windows endpoints and centrally managing recovery keys and compliance. Use this |
| 9 | skill to choose pre-boot mode, configure silent enablement, and plan recovery before rollout. |
| 10 | |
| 11 | **Do not use this skill** for general Intune device baseline (`intune-device-mgmt`), |
| 12 | macOS FileVault (use Intune disk encryption policy directly), or Azure VM disk |
| 13 | encryption (`azure-key-vault`). |
| 14 | |
| 15 | ## Pick the configuration by device type |
| 16 | |
| 17 | | Device profile | Pre-boot auth | Encryption | Notes | |
| 18 | |---|---|---|---| |
| 19 | | **Modern corporate laptop (TPM 2.0, Secure Boot)** | TPM-only (no PIN) | XTS-AES 256 | Default; silent enable | |
| 20 | | **High-sensitivity admin / Tier 0 (PAW)** | TPM + PIN | XTS-AES 256 | Stronger; pairs with PAW | |
| 21 | | **Kiosk / unattended** | TPM-only with Network Unlock | XTS-AES 256 | No user to type PIN | |
| 22 | | **Legacy device (no TPM 2.0 / no Secure Boot)** | Replace device | n/a | Don't try to enable on bare-metal legacy | |
| 23 | | **Removable media (USB)** | BitLocker To Go (password or smart card) | XTS-AES 256 | Separate policy | |
| 24 | | **Fixed data drives** | Auto-unlock with OS drive | XTS-AES 256 | Encrypt with OS drive | |
| 25 | |
| 26 | > **Rule of thumb:** TPM-only + silent enablement is the right default for 95% of modern |
| 27 | > corporate laptops. TPM+PIN doubles the security against physical attack but triples support |
| 28 | > calls. Reserve TPM+PIN for Tier 0 / PAW. |
| 29 | |
| 30 | ## Approach |
| 31 | |
| 32 | 1. **Confirm prerequisites** — TPM 2.0 (TPM 1.2 in narrow cases), Secure Boot UEFI, supported |
| 33 | Windows edition (Pro/Enterprise), Entra-joined or hybrid-joined (required for key escrow). |
| 34 | *Verify: `Get-Tpm` shows `TpmReady=True`; `manage-bde -status` shows the drive as |
| 35 | encryptable.* |
| 36 | |
| 37 | 2. **Configure Intune disk encryption policy** — Endpoint security → Disk encryption → |
| 38 | create a BitLocker profile. Set encryption method (XTS-AES 256), encrypt OS drive + |
| 39 | fixed drives, pre-boot mode (TPM-only by default). |
| 40 | |
| 41 | 3. **Silent enablement** — Enable **silently enable BitLocker on devices** and **escrow |
| 42 | recovery keys to Microsoft Entra ID automatically**. User sees no prompt; encryption |
| 43 | completes in background. This is the modern default. |
| 44 | *Verify: pilot device shows BitLocker = On, key escrowed to Entra (visible on device |
| 45 | object), no user interaction recorded.* |
| 46 | |
| 47 | 4. **Verify recovery key escrow before broad rollout** — Pull a pilot device's recovery key |
| 48 | from the Entra device blade. If you can't retrieve it, your policy is wrong - fix |
| 49 | **before** scaling. Un-escrowed keys mean unrecoverable devices. |
| 50 | *Verify: 100% of pilot ring devices have key visible in Entra; help desk can retrieve.* |
| 51 | |
| 52 | 5. **BitLocker To Go for removable drives** — Separate policy: require password (8+ chars) or |
| 53 | smart card for **removable-drive encryption**. Block writes to unencrypted removable |
| 54 | drives via Defender for Endpoint device control if data sensitivity warrants. |
| 55 | |
| 56 | 6. **Feed compliance and Conditional Access** — Add BitLocker / encryption to the Intune |
| 57 | compliance policy. CA grant control "Require compliant device" then gates corporate apps |
| 58 | on encryption status. |
| 59 | *Verify: an unencrypted device is reported non-compliant within the compliance grace |
| 60 | period; blocked by CA.* |
| 61 | |
| 62 | 7. **Monitor + recovery operations** — Encryption report daily; alert on devices stuck at |
| 63 | encrypting > 7 days. Document the help-desk recovery flow: user reads recovery key ID |
| 64 | from boot screen → help desk looks up in Entra → reads back the key. |
| 65 | |
| 66 | ## Guardrails |
| 67 | - **Verify recovery key escrow is working before broad rollout - un-escrowed keys risk data |
| 68 | loss.** Pilot 50 devices, retrieve every key, then scale. |
| 69 | - **Pilot pre-boot authentication choices; they affect user experience and automation / |
| 70 | imaging.** TPM+PIN can break Wake-on-LAN, remote management, and unattended reboots. |
| 71 | - **Removable-drive encryption |