$npx -y skills add vinayaklatthe/microsoft-security-skills --skill entra-idGuidance for Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) — cloud identity and access management and the control plane for Zero Trust. Covers tenant and identity model, authentication methods (passkeys, FIDO2, certificate-based), hybrid identity with Entra Connect or Cloud Sync, app re
| 1 | # Microsoft Entra ID |
| 2 | |
| 3 | Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure Active Directory) is the cloud identity and access |
| 4 | management service that authenticates users, devices, and workloads. It is the control plane |
| 5 | for Zero Trust and the foundation every other Microsoft security control assumes is healthy. |
| 6 | |
| 7 | ## When to use |
| 8 | Establishing the identity foundation: tenants, users/groups, authentication methods, SSO for |
| 9 | apps, and hybrid identity with on-premises Active Directory. Use this skill **before** |
| 10 | configuring Conditional Access, Identity Protection, or PIM - they all assume a clean Entra |
| 11 | ID baseline. |
| 12 | |
| 13 | **Do not use this skill** for risk-based sign-in detection (`entra-id-protection`), policy |
| 14 | enforcement (`conditional-access-mfa`), just-in-time admin roles (`azure-pim`), or lifecycle |
| 15 | workflows (`entra-id-governance`). |
| 16 | |
| 17 | ## Map the identity goal to the right Entra control |
| 18 | |
| 19 | | If the goal is... | Use | Notes | |
| 20 | |---|---|---| |
| 21 | | Sync on-prem AD users to cloud | **Entra Cloud Sync** (preferred new) or **Entra Connect Sync** | Cloud Sync is lighter, no server farm | |
| 22 | | Federate sign-in to on-prem | **AD FS** (legacy) or **Pass-Through Authentication** | Avoid new AD FS deployments; prefer PHS + WHfB | |
| 23 | | Replace passwords | **Passkeys (FIDO2)** > Windows Hello for Business > Microsoft Authenticator passwordless | Phishing-resistant only | |
| 24 | | Single sign-on to SaaS | **Enterprise Applications** (gallery or non-gallery) | OIDC > SAML where supported | |
| 25 | | Self-service password reset | **SSPR** with cloud writeback (hybrid) | Requires Entra ID P1 | |
| 26 | | Delegated admin scoped to a region/BU | **Administrative Units** | Combine with custom roles for least privilege | |
| 27 | | App calls Microsoft Graph or another API | **App Registration** + delegated/application permissions | Require admin consent workflow for risky scopes | |
| 28 | | Emergency tenant access if MFA breaks | **Break-glass accounts** (2x cloud-only, excluded from CA) | Hardware FIDO2 only; alerted on every sign-in | |
| 29 | |
| 30 | > **Rule of thumb:** if you are about to type a username and password into a Microsoft service |
| 31 | > in 2026, stop. Move to passkeys or WHfB. Password reuse + phishing is still the #1 root |
| 32 | > cause in identity incident response. |
| 33 | |
| 34 | ## Approach |
| 35 | |
| 36 | 1. **Tenant & identity model** — Decide cloud-only vs hybrid. Define naming conventions for |
| 37 | users, groups (assigned vs dynamic), and administrative units. Block guest invites at |
| 38 | tenant level by default; allow per-collaboration scenario. |
| 39 | *Verify: `Get-MgPolicyAuthorizationPolicy` shows `allowedToCreateApps = false` for default |
| 40 | users; admin consent workflow is enabled.* |
| 41 | |
| 42 | 2. **Hybrid identity** — Choose **Entra Cloud Sync** for new deployments (agent-based, |
| 43 | lightweight, supports disconnected forests). Use **Entra Connect Sync** only if you need |
| 44 | PHS + write-back features Cloud Sync doesn't yet support. Avoid new AD FS - it adds an |
| 45 | on-prem dependency and an attack surface (MDI sensor required). |
| 46 | *Verify: `Get-MgDirectoryOnPremisesSynchronization` shows healthy sync; password hash sync |
| 47 | enabled.* |
| 48 | |
| 49 | 3. **Authentication methods - move to phishing-resistant** — Manage via the **Authentication |
| 50 | methods policy** (replaces legacy MFA + SSPR registration policies). Roll out in this |
| 51 | order: Authenticator (push + number matching) → WHfB on managed devices → FIDO2 passkeys |
| 52 | for admins → broad passkey rollout. Disable SMS as a primary method. |
| 53 | *Verify: `User Registration Details` report shows > 90% of users with at least one |
| 54 | phishing-resistant method.* |
| 55 | |
| 56 | 4. **Applications & consent governance** — Use the gallery for SSO where available. Enable |
| 57 | **admin consent workflow** so users request high-risk permissions instead of granting them. |
| 58 | Run the **Risky Apps** report monthly. Apply least-privilege Graph permissions and review |
| 59 | app credentials (secrets vs certs vs federated identity). |
| 60 | *Verify: no consented apps with `Application.ReadWrite.All` or `Directory.ReadWrite.All` |
| 61 | outside the approved |