$npx -y skills add vinayaklatthe/microsoft-security-skills --skill insider-risk-baselineGuidance for establishing a Microsoft Purview Insider Risk Management (IRM) baseline - detecting and managing risky insider activity (data theft, leaks, policy violations) with privacy-by-design. Covers prerequisites, HR connector, policy templates, indicators, pseudonymisation,
| 1 | # Microsoft Purview Insider Risk Management (Baseline) |
| 2 | |
| 3 | Insider Risk Management (IRM) uses signals across Microsoft 365 and connected sources to detect, |
| 4 | investigate, and act on risky insider activity - data theft, leaks, and policy violations - with |
| 5 | **privacy-by-design** controls (pseudonymisation, RBAC, separation of duties). |
| 6 | |
| 7 | ## When to use |
| 8 | Standing up an insider-risk program: departing-employee data theft, sensitive-data leaks, and |
| 9 | security-policy violations - with legal/HR/privacy sponsorship in place. |
| 10 | |
| 11 | Do not use this skill for risk-adaptive DLP design after IRM is running (use |
| 12 | `purview-advanced-dlp`) or for general communication compliance (use |
| 13 | `purview-communication-compliance` if available). |
| 14 | |
| 15 | ## Pick the right starting policy template |
| 16 | | Concern | Template | |
| 17 | |---|---| |
| 18 | | Employees leaving with data | **Data theft by departing users** (needs HR connector for resignation/termination) | |
| 19 | | Sensitive-content leaks to unauthorised recipients | **Data leaks** (general / by priority users / by disgruntled users) | |
| 20 | | Security-policy violations (malware, AV disable, etc.) | **Security policy violations** | |
| 21 | | Risky AI usage | **Risky AI usage** (preview/GA as available) | |
| 22 | | Patient data / healthcare scenarios | **Patient data leaks** (sector-specific) | |
| 23 | |
| 24 | Rule of thumb: pick **one** template per quarter, tune it to acceptable signal-to-noise, then |
| 25 | add the next. Multiple templates active simultaneously without tuning swamps reviewers. |
| 26 | |
| 27 | ## Approach |
| 28 | 1. **Engage stakeholders** - Bring legal, HR, privacy, and (where applicable) works councils to |
| 29 | the design table; document the lawful basis for monitoring. |
| 30 | *Verify: signed-off scope document specifying data sources, retention, reviewer roles.* |
| 31 | 2. **Configure prerequisites** - Set IRM settings, enable required indicators (Office, device, |
| 32 | physical badging via connectors), and connect HR data via the **Microsoft 365 HR connector** |
| 33 | for events like resignation/termination. |
| 34 | *Verify: HR connector status is healthy and a test resignation event appears within 24 hours.* |
| 35 | 3. **Choose policy templates** - Start with templates: **data theft by departing users**, |
| 36 | **data leaks**, **security policy violations**, and risky AI usage; configure scope. |
| 37 | *Verify: policy is in place with a defined user scope (pilot first) and indicator set.* |
| 38 | 4. **Privacy by design** - Enable **pseudonymisation** of usernames, scope analyst/reviewer roles |
| 39 | tightly (RBAC, separation of duties), and configure anonymisation per legal/works-council |
| 40 | needs. |
| 41 | *Verify: reviewers see pseudonymised identifiers by default; un-anonymise requires elevated role.* |
| 42 | 5. **Triage & investigate** - Review alerts, build cases, examine the user activity timeline, and |
| 43 | escalate (e.g., to eDiscovery / HR) per the documented workflow. |
| 44 | *Verify: case management workflow exists with stages, owners, SLAs.* |
| 45 | 6. **Tune indicators and thresholds** - Adjust thresholds to acceptable signal-to-noise; document |
| 46 | tuning decisions for audit. |
| 47 | *Verify: alert volume per reviewer per week within the agreed range.* |
| 48 | 7. **Adaptive Protection** - Feed IRM risk levels into **Adaptive Protection** so DLP/Conditional |
| 49 | Access tighten dynamically for elevated-risk users. |
| 50 | *Verify: an elevated-risk test user triggers the stricter DLP branch.* |
| 51 | |
| 52 | ## Guardrails |
| 53 | - Engage legal/HR/privacy stakeholders before deployment; insider risk monitoring is sensitive |
| 54 | and getting governance wrong damages employee trust and creates legal risk. |
| 55 | - Use pseudonymisation and least-privilege reviewers by default; separate IRM analyst from |
| 56 | investigator roles. |
| 57 | - Tune indicator thresholds to avoid alert overload; start with a focused scope (one BU or |
| 58 | priority-user group) before tenant-wide. |
| 59 | - HR connector is mandatory for departing-user detection - resignation/termination events drive |
| 60 | the highest-confidence signal; without it the template is half-blind. |
| 61 | - Document retention for IRM signals/cases per legal/regulatory requirements; do not retain |
| 62 | longer than justified. |
| 63 | |
| 64 | ## Common anti-patterns |
| 65 | - Switching on every template tenant-wide on day one - reviewer fatigue within a week. |
| 66 | - No HR connector - departing-user template fires on weak signal and misses real cases. |
| 67 | - Pseudonymisation off because "we trust our analysts" - works council and legal disagree lat |