$npx -y skills add zhaoxuya520/reverse-skill --skill competition-mailbox-abuseInternal downstream skill for ctf-sandbox-orchestrator. CTF-sandbox workflow for enterprise mail abuse, OAuth consent, inbox or forwarding rules, transport rules, shared mailbox access, phishing chains, and token-to-mailbox side effects. Use when the user asks to trace mailbox ru
| 1 | # Competition Mailbox Abuse |
| 2 | |
| 3 | Use this skill only as a downstream specialization after `$ctf-sandbox-orchestrator` is already active and has established sandbox assumptions, node ownership, and evidence priorities. If that has not happened yet, return to `$ctf-sandbox-orchestrator` first. |
| 4 | |
| 5 | Use this skill when the decisive path runs through mailbox behavior, consent flow, or message-routing effects rather than generic AD evidence alone. |
| 6 | |
| 7 | Reply in Simplified Chinese unless the user explicitly requests English. |
| 8 | |
| 9 | ## Quick Start |
| 10 | |
| 11 | 1. Decide whether the active path is phishing-to-consent, token-to-mailbox, rule-based persistence, or transport-level mail rerouting. |
| 12 | 2. Keep mailbox evidence, identity evidence, and message-trace evidence tied to the same user, mailbox, token, or message ID. |
| 13 | 3. Separate possession of a token or delegate edge from the actual mailbox effect it enables. |
| 14 | 4. Record forwarding targets, rule predicates, consent scopes, shared mailbox edges, and resulting mail flow in compact blocks. |
| 15 | 5. Reproduce the smallest mail effect that proves persistence, exfiltration, or privilege. |
| 16 | |
| 17 | ## Workflow |
| 18 | |
| 19 | ### 1. Map The Mail Trust Path |
| 20 | |
| 21 | - Identify the principal, mailbox, token or session, consent grant, delegate edge, shared mailbox relationship, or app registration involved. |
| 22 | - Record consent scopes, mailbox permissions, rule ownership, transport actions, and message-trace identifiers. |
| 23 | - Distinguish client-visible symptoms from server-side mailbox or transport state. |
| 24 | |
| 25 | ### 2. Prove The Mailbox Effect |
| 26 | |
| 27 | - Correlate consent logs, sign-ins, message traces, inbox rules, transport rules, forwarding settings, and mailbox audit events. |
| 28 | - Show which rule or token produces which concrete effect: silent forwarding, marking read, deletion, delegate access, or message rerouting. |
| 29 | - Keep message IDs, sender or recipient pairs, and timestamps aligned across logs. |
| 30 | |
| 31 | ### 3. Reduce To The Decisive Abuse Chain |
| 32 | |
| 33 | - Compress the path to the smallest sequence: lure or grant -> token or delegate edge -> mailbox or transport mutation -> resulting mail effect. |
| 34 | - State clearly whether persistence lives in consent, mailbox rules, transport config, or shared mailbox permissions. |
| 35 | - If the task broadens into host pivots or Kerberos acceptance, switch back to the broader identity skill. |
| 36 | |
| 37 | ## Read This Reference |
| 38 | |
| 39 | - Load `references/mailbox-abuse.md` for the consent checklist, rule checklist, and evidence packaging. |
| 40 | |
| 41 | ## What To Preserve |
| 42 | |
| 43 | - Consent scopes, token claims, mailbox permissions, rule definitions, forwarding targets, and message IDs |
| 44 | - Message-trace lines, audit events, and mailbox effects tied to the same mail path |
| 45 | - The smallest replayable sequence that proves persistence, exfiltration, or delegate access |